導(dǎo)讀
就不斷升級(jí)的中美貿(mào)易摩擦問(wèn)題，中國(guó)金融四十人論壇（CF40）和新經(jīng)濟(jì)思維研究院（INET）于3月24日共同組織了主題為“中美貿(mào)易沖突與合作前景”的國(guó)際交流晚餐會(huì)。
哈佛大學(xué)教授、美國(guó)總統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)前主席Martin Feldstein，耶魯大學(xué)高級(jí)研究員Stephen Roach，英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》首席經(jīng)濟(jì)評(píng)論員Martin Wolf，美國(guó)對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)特聘研究員、美國(guó)前貿(mào)易代表Michael Froman，CF40學(xué)術(shù)顧問(wèn)、國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）原副總裁朱民，CF40學(xué)術(shù)委員、國(guó)務(wù)院發(fā)展研究中心副主任隆國(guó)強(qiáng)等進(jìn)行了主題交流。CF40學(xué)術(shù)顧問(wèn)、清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)錢(qián)穎一主持了晚餐會(huì)。
今天推送的是Stephen Roach在此次交流會(huì)上的演講。他認(rèn)為，美國(guó)貿(mào)易赤字上升的重要原因在于美國(guó)的主要矛盾，即在沒(méi)有儲(chǔ)蓄的情況下追求增長(zhǎng)。在這種情況下，美國(guó)要從國(guó)外進(jìn)口資本，同時(shí)必須面對(duì)經(jīng)常賬戶赤字和多邊貿(mào)易不平衡。
Stephen Roach指出，美國(guó)的主要矛盾當(dāng)前并沒(méi)有一個(gè)很好的解決方案。“我們正在實(shí)行財(cái)政刺激，而現(xiàn)在并不是一個(gè)好的時(shí)點(diǎn)，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)良好，也接近充分就業(yè)。”他說(shuō)，在國(guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄率很低的情況下采取刺激措施，只會(huì)使美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄率從2％下降到0％，推動(dòng)經(jīng)常賬戶赤字進(jìn)一步上升，以及多邊貿(mào)易失衡擴(kuò)大。隨著多邊貿(mào)易赤字的增加，美國(guó)開(kāi)始對(duì)貿(mào)易盈余國(guó)實(shí)施保護(hù)主義政策，而這些國(guó)家為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)提供了資本。
“我們的政治家不關(guān)心統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字，指責(zé)中國(guó)是更容易的事。”Stephen Roach說(shuō)。
Stephen Roach曾任摩根士丹利亞洲區(qū)主席和首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。他在摩根士丹利30年的職業(yè)生涯中，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)了一支來(lái)自全球的高水平經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家團(tuán)隊(duì)。他在其著作《失衡：后經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)時(shí)代的再平衡》中分析了21世紀(jì)最重要的中美經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和挑戰(zhàn)。
本文由CF40秘書(shū)處翻譯，略有刪減，后附英文原文供您參考。
習(xí)近平主席說(shuō)目前中國(guó)的主要矛盾是人民日益增長(zhǎng)的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的發(fā)展之間的矛盾。這對(duì)于評(píng)估中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景提供了一個(gè)有力的框架。解決這一主要矛盾對(duì)中國(guó)在2050年進(jìn)入新時(shí)代是非常重要的。如果矛盾得不到解決，則會(huì)導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)失敗，在任何國(guó)家都是如此。
對(duì)于中國(guó)而言，解決策略是明確的，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)正在進(jìn)行調(diào)整，從制造業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)向服務(wù)業(yè)，從農(nóng)村向城市轉(zhuǎn)移，從出口轉(zhuǎn)向消費(fèi)。 但最重要的是，從剩余儲(chǔ)蓄到吸收儲(chǔ)蓄，同時(shí)提高對(duì)居民的社會(huì)保障，這在老齡化背景下尤其重要。中國(guó)認(rèn)識(shí)到了主要矛盾，并提出一個(gè)解決方案的框架。
我想來(lái)討論一下美國(guó)的主要矛盾。我們的主要矛盾在于在沒(méi)有儲(chǔ)蓄的情況下追求增長(zhǎng)。與現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)史上任何發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家相比，我們擁有最低的國(guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄率。我們來(lái)看凈國(guó)民儲(chǔ)蓄率這個(gè)指標(biāo)，即企業(yè)儲(chǔ)蓄，家庭儲(chǔ)蓄和政府支出的凈值。 2017年前三個(gè)季度美國(guó)的凈儲(chǔ)蓄率為1.9％，20世紀(jì)最后三十年的平均值為6.3％。所以現(xiàn)在的凈國(guó)民儲(chǔ)蓄率不到過(guò)去長(zhǎng)期平均水平的三分之一。缺乏儲(chǔ)蓄但還要增長(zhǎng)，所以我們從國(guó)外進(jìn)口資本，同時(shí)必須面對(duì)經(jīng)常賬戶赤字和多邊貿(mào)易不平衡。2017年，美國(guó)對(duì)102個(gè)國(guó)家是貿(mào)易赤字，其中中國(guó)占比最大。
去年美國(guó)的貨物貿(mào)易逆差為7960億美元，其中47％也就是3750億美元左右是來(lái)自中國(guó)。 總統(tǒng)夸張說(shuō)是5000億美元。 47％中至少有40％來(lái)自于在中國(guó)以外制造但在中國(guó)組裝的產(chǎn)品的供應(yīng)鏈效應(yīng)。 如果考慮來(lái)自中國(guó)以外的投入，使用經(jīng)合組織和WTO提供的貿(mào)易和增值矩陣進(jìn)行調(diào)整，則可以將47％份額降至28％。盡管這個(gè)數(shù)字遠(yuǎn)低于總統(tǒng)和美國(guó)財(cái)政部所用的數(shù)字，而且順差是由于中國(guó)的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)導(dǎo)致，美國(guó)政界并不買(mǎi)賬。我們的政治家不關(guān)心統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字，指責(zé)中國(guó)是更容易的事。
在美國(guó)，我們有主要矛盾，但沒(méi)有解決方案。我們正在實(shí)行財(cái)政刺激，而現(xiàn)在并不是一個(gè)好的時(shí)點(diǎn)。因?yàn)槲覀兊慕?jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)良好，接近充分就業(yè)。 國(guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄率很低的情況下采取刺激措施，只會(huì)使我們的儲(chǔ)蓄率從2％下降到0％，推動(dòng)經(jīng)常賬戶赤字進(jìn)一步上升，以及多邊貿(mào)易失衡擴(kuò)大。隨著多邊貿(mào)易赤字的增加，我們開(kāi)始對(duì)貿(mào)易盈余國(guó)實(shí)施保護(hù)主義政策，而這些國(guó)家為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)提供了資本。
所以，對(duì)比兩國(guó)，一個(gè)主要矛盾有解決方案，一個(gè)沒(méi)有。 這顯然會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響，并波及世界其他國(guó)家。 我希望自己能像Martin那樣自信地說(shuō)特朗普是個(gè)好說(shuō)大話又事后收回的人。他的很多話沒(méi)有兌現(xiàn)，但有些事情會(huì)觸及他的核心原則，而長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)他發(fā)表了很多反中國(guó)的言論。我自己的直覺(jué)是，他就這個(gè)話題說(shuō)了這么多話，分貝這么高，再后退不可能不丟掉很多支持者。所以我覺(jué)得他不會(huì)這么做。
如何解決兩國(guó)的貿(mào)易沖突？我認(rèn)為沒(méi)有簡(jiǎn)單的方法來(lái)解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，但有如下幾點(diǎn)方案供參考。
第一，我們需要由兩國(guó)政府高層人員就經(jīng)濟(jì)和戰(zhàn)略關(guān)系的共同利益進(jìn)行認(rèn)真對(duì)話，但現(xiàn)在還沒(méi)有有效的解決方案。 我們需要一個(gè)由專家組成的常設(shè)秘書(shū)機(jī)構(gòu)，在有共同利益的領(lǐng)域，就風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和政策進(jìn)行持續(xù)的討論和交流。
第二點(diǎn)，我認(rèn)為雙邊投資條約是進(jìn)入對(duì)方市場(chǎng)的最佳機(jī)制。 美國(guó)跨國(guó)公司如果不在中國(guó)參與這個(gè)未來(lái)市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，是會(huì)很可惜的，但如果市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入不公平，那么我們不能這樣做。
第三是軟問(wèn)題，現(xiàn)在西方和新聞界都有這樣的印象——中國(guó)讓我們都失望了，中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織，但中國(guó)沒(méi)有提供我們期望的機(jī)會(huì)。所以中國(guó)需要在輿論舞臺(tái)上做得更好，講述自己的故事，展開(kāi)公關(guān)攻勢(shì)。
總的來(lái)說(shuō)，我非常擔(dān)心兩國(guó)沖突會(huì)升級(jí)。也許特朗普是虛張聲勢(shì)，我希望是這樣。特朗普是完全不可預(yù)測(cè)的，我們不能忽視潛在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因?yàn)閷?duì)我們所有人來(lái)說(shuō)，這樣做風(fēng)險(xiǎn)太高了。
附英文全文：
As stated by President Xi Jinping, China’s principal contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate growth and the growing needs of the people provides us with a very powerful framework to assess the prospects for the Chinese economy. Its resolution is essential for China to reach the New Era by 2050. Unresolved, however, assures chaos and failure of the Chinese system. I believe this concept is also applicable to other systems – Marxist, non-Marxist, state driven or not.
Indeed, the Unites States has a principal contradiction of its own — growth without saving.
We have the lowest domestic savings rate of any leading country in the modern era. The place to start is with the net national savings rate — the sum total of business saving, household saving, and government dis-saving, all adjusted for depreciation. The depreciation adjustment is important because we want to know how much the nation saves after it’s done after replenishing its worn-out capital stock. The net national savings rate of the US was, in fact, 1.9% over the first three quarters of 2017, which is less than one-third the 6.3% average for the final three decades of the 20th century.
That leads us to America’s principal contradiction. Lacking in saving but wanting to grow, we import surplus savings from abroad and run massive current account deficits and multilateral trade imbalances to balance the inflows. Last year, the US multilateral trade deficit was distributed over 102 individual nations, including, of course, China, by far the largest piece of the overall trade deficit.
But it is important to have a clear understanding of the numbers in the contentious trade debate that is now boiling over. Of the approximately $796 billion total U.S. merchandise trade deficit in 2017, fully $375 billion, or 47%, was with China. President Trump claims this number was $500 billion but that is clearly another one of his exaggerations. However, at least 40% of the 47% reflects supply chain effects of components and parts that are for produced outside of China but are assembled inside China. So, if you do the supply chain adjustments using the trade and value-added matrices that have been put together by the OECD and WTO, you can cut the 47% share of the $800 billion deficit down to around 28%.
This is still a very big number. But it is far below that used by President Trump and well below the published figures of the US Department of Commerce, which does not make supply-chain, value added adjustments. While the international specialization of comparative advantage accounts for this outsize portion, that argument is not credible in a political arena looking for someone to blame. Politicians, have no patience for statistics — they find it much easier to point the finger at China.
But I have digressed. Significantly, the concept of the principal contradiction is especially useful because it is forward looking. For China the strategy for resolution is clear — it involves rebalancing, moving from manufacturing to services, rural to urban, exports to consumption. But most importantly, it also entails from surplus saving to saving absorption, reflecting a strengthening the social safety net for families to deal with the retirement and healthcare needs of an aging Chinese society. So for China, there is a principal contradiction, and there is a framework of resolution that goes with it.
In the US we have a principal contradiction, without a resolution. And it is going to get worse. We are opting for a poorly timed fiscal stimulus when the economy is doing better, and we are near full employment. We are also doing a fiscal stimulus with a low domestic savings rate, an action that will take our net domestic savings rate from 2%, at present, to possibly 0. That would then make our current account deficit even wider, with likely increases in the broad scale of the multilateral trade imbalances. The final ingredient of this contradiction is that just at the trade deficit gets wider, we are turning protectionist on the surplus economies that provide us with the surplus capital that we need to fund our economy.
So, there you have it: Two contradictions, one gets resolved and one doesn’t. There will obviously be consequences, across the board, especially for China and the US but also for the rest of the world. I wish I could be as confident as some and say that this is just the political bluster of a president who is well practiced in the “art of the deal.” I worry that view is too complacent. He’s backed off on a lot of things over the past year, but there are certain things that are core issues to his base, and his strident and long held anti-China rhetoric is a clear example of that. My own instinct is that he has emphasized this particular topic for so long and he has raised the decibel level so high that it will be extremely hard for him to get out of this position without losing considerable support from his base. I hope I am wrong here and the optimists are right, but there is a considerable risk that may not be the case.
I do not think there is a simple way to resolve this. I would recommend three actions to address these mounting risks. One, we need to reestablish ongoing serious level engagement between the experts in our two governments at the highest levels on the areas of mutual interest for our economic and strategic relationship. We’ve done it so many different ways in recent years, but the results have been disappointing, to say the least. A better option would be to establish a permanent secretariat that engages experts in both the US and China on an ongoing basis to examine areas of mutual interest — as well as the risks and policies that are required to address to these issues.
Second, I think a Bilateral Investment Treaty would be the best mechanism for both sides to gain access to each other’s markets. Shame on American multinationals if they are not actively engaged in China to compete in this rapidly growing market. But that won’t happen if market access isn’t fair. The political climate makes BIT negotiations exceedingly difficult right now. But I still think it would be worth the effort — especially in an adverse political climate.
Third, there’s the so-called soft issues. There’s an impression right now in the West that China has let us all down — that the enormous opportunity that was supposed to come after WTO accession in has simply not materialized the way the West was expecting. This opinion is expressed widely in the press, as well as in the National Security Strategy published by the Trump Administration last December. If China objects to this impression — and I am certain that is the case — then it needs to do a better job in the arena of public opinion to tell its side of the story. This is as much an image battle, as anything.
In sum, I am quite worried about the potential fort escalating trade conflict between the US and China. Maybe Trump is bluffing, and as I said, I very much hope that's the case. But let's face it, since the man is totally unpredictable, we can't afford to ignore the risks. The stakes are too high for all of us to take this hope for granted.
作者Stephen Roach系耶魯大學(xué)高級(jí)研究員。本文系作者在“中美貿(mào)易沖突與合作前景”國(guó)際交流晚餐會(huì)上的演講。
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