強(qiáng)勁消費(fèi)驅(qū)動(dòng)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)良性循環(huán) 2024年經(jīng)濟(jì)前景充滿不確定性
Q1：您如何預(yù)期2024年美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景？有觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，為將通脹拉回目標(biāo)區(qū)間，經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退或是不可避免的，您對(duì)此有何看法？
Nathan SHEETS：過(guò)去幾年來(lái)，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)展現(xiàn)出了極強(qiáng)韌性。2023年初的時(shí)候，我預(yù)計(jì)當(dāng)年美國(guó)就會(huì)陷入衰退，然而，我們現(xiàn)在卻看到美國(guó)出現(xiàn)了高于趨勢(shì)水平的增長(zhǎng)。
美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)保持韌性的關(guān)鍵是形成了由消費(fèi)（尤其是服務(wù)消費(fèi)）驅(qū)動(dòng)的良性循環(huán)。服務(wù)消費(fèi)旺盛，對(duì)就業(yè)市場(chǎng)形成支撐，企業(yè)用工需求增加，加大了工資上行壓力，而工資加速增長(zhǎng)又進(jìn)一步提振消費(fèi)。所以，一定程度上，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)形成了良性循環(huán)。
近期服務(wù)消費(fèi)是否已經(jīng)呈現(xiàn)放緩跡象？是否已有證據(jù)顯示就業(yè)市場(chǎng)趨于緩和？我的回答是肯定的，但即使從“強(qiáng)勁”降至“溫和”，我們看到的跡象表明，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)依然堅(jiān)挺。截至目前，我還沒(méi)有看到衰退的信號(hào)。
過(guò)去一段時(shí)間，我的正式預(yù)測(cè)一直是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)將在2024年中陷入衰退。原因之一在于，從歷史上看，當(dāng)通脹水平和工資增速如此之高時(shí)，為使其降至更加可持續(xù)的水平、恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)平衡，衰退可能在所難免，就業(yè)市場(chǎng)往往會(huì)放緩，失業(yè)率通常會(huì)攀升。過(guò)去的降通脹都伴隨著這些特點(diǎn)。
但是目前為止，數(shù)據(jù)方面并不支持這個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)。因此，目前我對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)將會(huì)衰退還是“軟著陸”，保持著比較平衡的預(yù)期。這次是否真的不一樣，仍尚待觀察。
我們的正式預(yù)測(cè)顯示，2024年美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增速為1%，低于2023年的2%以上，但這個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)考慮到了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入衰退的情形。事實(shí)上，我設(shè)想美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)會(huì)面臨兩種不同的情形：如果經(jīng)歷衰退，那么GDP增速預(yù)計(jì)為1%或更低；如果不發(fā)生衰退，那么GDP增速可能會(huì)和2023年差不多，在2%左右。
我知道很多觀察人員、分析人員都認(rèn)為，美國(guó)不太可能陷入衰退了，但我還不是那么確定，原因如前所述。在全球各國(guó)中，我認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)不確定性最強(qiáng)的還是美國(guó)。
2023年的美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)給我?guī)?lái)了向上的驚喜，希望2024年也能如此。
Q2：為什么至今為止這一輪降通脹沒(méi)有引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退？
Nathan SHEETS：這也是我一直在思考的問(wèn)題。如果在兩年之前你問(wèn)我，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在大約18個(gè)月的時(shí)間內(nèi)加息超過(guò)500個(gè)基點(diǎn)會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)和全球經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響，我會(huì)回答：一定會(huì)造成嚴(yán)重沖擊，導(dǎo)致金融市場(chǎng)承壓，甚至引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，帶來(lái)挑戰(zhàn)和困難。
如果美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)反而很好地吸收了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的緊縮政策，又是怎么回事？我認(rèn)為有幾個(gè)原因：
第一，強(qiáng)勁的服務(wù)消費(fèi)支撐美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)。本輪許多消費(fèi)來(lái)自疫情期間被抑制的對(duì)出行、住宿、娛樂(lè)、休閑、餐飲等服務(wù)的累積需求。疫情結(jié)束之后，這些需求以對(duì)價(jià)格和利率高度不敏感的方式得到了釋放——無(wú)論宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境如何，消費(fèi)者就是要花錢。與此相一致地，疫情期間美國(guó)居民積攢的大量?jī)?chǔ)蓄也足以支持他們的消費(fèi)。綜合來(lái)看，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)加息都未能顯著抑制的服務(wù)需求是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素。
第二，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)加息效果被削弱。本輪加息周期之前的十年，是貨幣環(huán)境寬松、利率水平很低的十年，也正因此，這十年間家庭和企業(yè)還貸、還債壓力并不太大。美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)還有一個(gè)關(guān)鍵特點(diǎn)，就是其30年期按揭貸款利率不受美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)加息影響，美國(guó)一些家庭、企業(yè)把短期貸款轉(zhuǎn)為了長(zhǎng)期貸款，這削弱了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)加息的效果。
第三，服務(wù)業(yè)占美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的比重越來(lái)越大，而服務(wù)業(yè)本身是更輕資本的行業(yè)，對(duì)借貸、投資的需求更小，所以天然對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)加息不那么敏感。這是更具結(jié)構(gòu)性、長(zhǎng)期性的一個(gè)因素。
以上是三個(gè)我認(rèn)為可以解釋美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)加息不敏感的因素。
另一個(gè)與此相關(guān)的問(wèn)題是，現(xiàn)在的情況到底是貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)的滯后期已經(jīng)過(guò)去、加息已經(jīng)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生了影響，還是只是說(shuō)滯后期比以前更長(zhǎng)了、傳導(dǎo)得更慢了而美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)加息最終還是會(huì)給經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)陣痛？
我認(rèn)為這個(gè)問(wèn)題尚無(wú)定論。我更傾向于后者，主要原因是即使貸款期限延長(zhǎng)了，最終總有一天還是要還，人們總要申請(qǐng)新的貸款，企業(yè)也需要在債務(wù)到期時(shí)進(jìn)行再融資。此外，在未來(lái)數(shù)個(gè)季度，我們會(huì)看到服務(wù)需求的釋放逐漸結(jié)束，事實(shí)上，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)開始朝著這個(gè)方向發(fā)展了，我預(yù)計(jì)這個(gè)過(guò)程可能會(huì)在2024年上半年告終。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策正在轉(zhuǎn)向 抗通脹“最終章”難點(diǎn)在于服務(wù)通脹
Q3：美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的首要目標(biāo)是否正在或者即將從引導(dǎo)通脹下降轉(zhuǎn)向引導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)“軟著陸”？您對(duì)此有何分析？
Nathan SHEETS：我認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策正在轉(zhuǎn)向（pivot）。很多人都用了這個(gè)詞來(lái)形容鮑威爾在12月新聞發(fā)布會(huì)上的講話，我認(rèn)為它很合適。
在之前的新聞發(fā)布會(huì)上，鮑威爾往往會(huì)說(shuō)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的首要目標(biāo)是降通脹，致力于在降通脹的過(guò)程中盡量制定最合適的政策，既不過(guò)度緊縮、也不過(guò)度寬松。但如果一定要犯錯(cuò)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)寧可過(guò)度緊縮也要保證徹底解決通脹問(wèn)題。
而在12月新聞發(fā)布會(huì)，記者又問(wèn)了鮑威爾一個(gè)類似問(wèn)題，鮑威爾此次卻強(qiáng)調(diào)了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)要努力避免政策過(guò)于激進(jìn)。這一表態(tài)與此前口吻大不相同，也讓我相信，隨著通脹回落——至少是回到了3%以下——美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)更多地觀望，在降通脹的同時(shí)，比以前更重視保護(hù)經(jīng)濟(jì)。
事實(shí)上，鮑威爾這一表態(tài)甚至讓我猜測(cè)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能也在思考，“如果要以衰退為代價(jià)換來(lái)百分之二點(diǎn)多（high-twos inflation）的通脹，不是劃算的買賣”?？傊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)確實(shí)是在轉(zhuǎn)向的。
那么，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)這一轉(zhuǎn)向是否正確？我其實(shí)認(rèn)為，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)實(shí)施轉(zhuǎn)向的過(guò)程應(yīng)該更溫和、更漸進(jìn)一些，而這次轉(zhuǎn)向讓人感到非常突然。12月鮑威爾發(fā)言以后，市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)非常劇烈，融資環(huán)境大幅放寬，可美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策傳導(dǎo)的關(guān)鍵之一恰恰是維持融資環(huán)境的緊縮。融資環(huán)境大幅放寬意味著美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)貨幣政策對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的約束力和牽引力減弱。具有諷刺意味的是，市場(chǎng)越是活躍、上漲，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的難度就越大。
所以，我能理解為什么美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的政策基調(diào)和溝通口吻在12月會(huì)議上發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變，但我認(rèn)為如果能隨著接下來(lái)的多次會(huì)議更加漸進(jìn)地轉(zhuǎn)向，效果也會(huì)更加理想。比如，春天轉(zhuǎn)向一點(diǎn)、夏天再轉(zhuǎn)向一點(diǎn)，會(huì)比一次大幅轉(zhuǎn)向更好。
Q4：在您看來(lái)，現(xiàn)在是否可以說(shuō)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)取得了抗通脹勝利？
Nathan SHEETS：美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)最關(guān)心的問(wèn)題就是通脹走勢(shì)，也在降通脹方面取得了顯著進(jìn)展。其最重視的通脹指標(biāo)之一——核心個(gè)人消費(fèi)支出（PCE）——在2022年升至5.5%左右的峰值之后，現(xiàn)已降至3.5%左右。結(jié)合我們對(duì)未來(lái)數(shù)月經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)的預(yù)期以及一些技術(shù)性因素，預(yù)計(jì)2024年初美國(guó)核心PCE很可能會(huì)降至3%以下。
PCE從5.5%左右的水平降至3%甚至更低是很顯著的進(jìn)步，我認(rèn)為這已讓美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)感到滿意——從鮑威爾近期在發(fā)布會(huì)上的表態(tài)也可以看得出來(lái)。
然而，目前備受爭(zhēng)議的主要問(wèn)題在于，通脹從高位降至2%目標(biāo)水平這個(gè)過(guò)程的“最終章”，與此前階段相比會(huì)否明顯更難？
我一直以來(lái)的觀點(diǎn)是，“最后一公里”的主要難點(diǎn)在于對(duì)抗服務(wù)通脹。出于累積需求釋放等不同的原因，美國(guó)的服務(wù)需求非常強(qiáng)勁，想要抑制這種需求，可能需要就業(yè)市場(chǎng)更廣泛地放緩、失業(yè)率進(jìn)一步升高，甚至是經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。這會(huì)比此前階段更加痛苦，因?yàn)橹巴浄啪徶饕靡嬗谟扇蚬?yīng)鏈復(fù)蘇、全球商品需求疲軟和大宗商品價(jià)格下降驅(qū)動(dòng)的商品價(jià)格回落。
總之，截至目前，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在對(duì)抗通脹上取得了顯著進(jìn)展，但降通脹的最后一段路仍充滿不確定性，而問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵，就在于這最后一段路會(huì)有多難。
通脹回到2%水平確有必要 但美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)降通脹政策或更加漸進(jìn)
Q5：您如何展望未來(lái)一到兩年美國(guó)的通脹形勢(shì)？通脹距離回到2%目標(biāo)水平還有多久？
Nathan SHEETS：通脹水平從3%到2%這最后一段路會(huì)充滿困難、更加痛苦、更加漫長(zhǎng)，我認(rèn)為這個(gè)目標(biāo)更可能在2025年實(shí)現(xiàn)，不過(guò)，2024年也會(huì)取得一些逐步的進(jìn)展。
與此相關(guān)的一個(gè)問(wèn)題是，當(dāng)通脹降至2%-3%的區(qū)間內(nèi)以后，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)花多大力氣來(lái)繼續(xù)對(duì)抗通脹？當(dāng)通脹降至3%以后，比如2.9%、2.8%、2.7%，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)真的愿意一直維持緊縮政策、甚至不惜冒著衰退風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，將其進(jìn)一步降至2%嗎？還是可能開始“松開手剎”？
鮑威爾在12月新聞發(fā)布會(huì)上表現(xiàn)出的對(duì)進(jìn)一步貨幣緊縮、上調(diào)利率的意愿比我此前想象的更加有限。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能正在釋放信號(hào)，表明其愿意在實(shí)現(xiàn)2%通脹目標(biāo)前耐心等待更長(zhǎng)時(shí)間。
我認(rèn)為，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)對(duì)抗通脹的最終姿態(tài)還是取決于通脹預(yù)期——只要通脹預(yù)期錨定在2%左右，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)就可以有更大自由度，以更漸進(jìn)的方式使通脹回落。
這一問(wèn)題的回答需要綜合考慮許多因素，但不管是從宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)角度來(lái)看還是從貨幣政策角度來(lái)看，接下來(lái)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)降通脹的進(jìn)程都會(huì)顯著放緩。
Q6：從務(wù)實(shí)的角度來(lái)看，您認(rèn)為通脹需要回落到2%的目標(biāo)水平嗎?
Nathan SHEETS：這是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題。如果你問(wèn)15個(gè)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，“美國(guó)最優(yōu)通脹目標(biāo)是多少”，我認(rèn)為他們大多數(shù)都會(huì)說(shuō)3%左右而不是2%。從這個(gè)角度來(lái)看，你可以說(shuō)2%甚至都不是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的最優(yōu)選擇。既然如此，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)似乎沒(méi)有必要以經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和就業(yè)增長(zhǎng)為代價(jià)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)2%的目標(biāo)。
但經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家凡事都看兩面。從另一面看，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)致力于實(shí)現(xiàn)2%目標(biāo)的原因恰恰是出于非?，F(xiàn)實(shí)的考慮，那就是它已經(jīng)承諾了要實(shí)現(xiàn)2%目標(biāo)。2%不一定比3%更優(yōu)，但是因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)向公眾、市場(chǎng)乃至全世界做出了要使通脹回到2%的承諾，這就成了關(guān)乎美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)信譽(yù)的問(wèn)題。所以，我也確實(shí)認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)需要實(shí)現(xiàn)2%的通脹目標(biāo)。
但如前面所說(shuō)，回到2%的速度有多快，取決于市場(chǎng)給美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的操作空間有多大，這個(gè)空間又取決于通脹預(yù)期及其錨定程度，而通脹預(yù)期反過(guò)來(lái)也反映著美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)信譽(yù)水平。所以，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)是要守信用，但可以給自己更多時(shí)間，以降低抗通脹對(duì)就業(yè)和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)以及經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的沖擊。
未來(lái)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)或許會(huì)重新考慮通脹目標(biāo)，但在當(dāng)前的周期內(nèi)，不管是從現(xiàn)實(shí)角度來(lái)看還是從政策角度來(lái)看，回到2%都是必要的。
2024年美國(guó)貨幣環(huán)境將大幅放寬 適應(yīng)更低通脹、穩(wěn)定實(shí)際利率或?yàn)橹饕紤]
Q7：您對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)2024年的貨幣政策取向有何具體展望？
Nathan SHEETS：鑒于貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)的滯后性以及應(yīng)對(duì)服務(wù)通脹的挑戰(zhàn)性，我認(rèn)為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)還是面臨著一定的衰退風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如果陷入衰退，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)或?qū)⑤^為激進(jìn)地降息。這種情景下，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)最可能在2024年下半年降息100個(gè)基點(diǎn)甚至更多，需要降息四次甚至更多。
但是，如果如美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)所料想的那樣，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)“軟著陸”，那么合理的基準(zhǔn)情形就是降息75個(gè)基點(diǎn)，就像美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)所說(shuō)的那樣降息三次。
總的來(lái)看，無(wú)論如何降息、經(jīng)濟(jì)怎么發(fā)展，我們都要做好2024年美國(guó)貨幣環(huán)境在一定程度上放寬的準(zhǔn)備。
另外一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題是，隨著通脹回落，如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不調(diào)整聯(lián)邦基金利率，那么隱含的實(shí)際利率（即聯(lián)邦基金利率與通脹率之差）就會(huì)上升。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)曾暗示過(guò)這個(gè)問(wèn)題，這也是在“軟著陸”情境下它會(huì)降息三次的原因之一。從這個(gè)角度看，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)降息就只是為了適應(yīng)更低的通脹。在某種意義上，我覺得美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)認(rèn)為，這不是金融環(huán)境的放松，也不是貨幣政策的放松。
但無(wú)論如何，降息是正確的。我認(rèn)為，至少?gòu)氖袌?chǎng)的角度看，不會(huì)對(duì)由實(shí)際利率導(dǎo)致的調(diào)整和由其他因素導(dǎo)致的調(diào)整做那么嚴(yán)格的區(qū)分?？傊?，2024年肯定會(huì)降息，幅度應(yīng)該也不小。
Q8：您如何展望未來(lái)一到兩年美國(guó)的實(shí)際利率水平？
Nathan SHEETS：這是一個(gè)好問(wèn)題。美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)爭(zhēng)論最多的一個(gè)問(wèn)題也是中性實(shí)際利率（R*）的走勢(shì)。
R*是指經(jīng)濟(jì)處于穩(wěn)定或均衡狀態(tài)下的實(shí)際利率。疫情以前，我們普遍認(rèn)為美國(guó)的R*在0.5%左右。在通脹為2%的前提下，R*為0.5%意味著中性名義聯(lián)邦基金利率在2.5%左右。目前，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的預(yù)測(cè)依然是這樣，所以其一直以來(lái)釋放的信號(hào)也都是R*在0.5%左右、中性名義利率在2.5%左右。
但現(xiàn)在一個(gè)普遍觀點(diǎn)是，R*可能略有上升，其原因包括經(jīng)濟(jì)變化、全球化放緩、凈零轉(zhuǎn)型對(duì)資本的需求增加、人口老齡化的影響以及貨幣政策正常化相關(guān)的因素等。我不認(rèn)為R*出現(xiàn)顯著升高，沒(méi)有相關(guān)證據(jù)。我傾向于認(rèn)為R*目前在1%左右，而不是0.5%，這意味著中性名義聯(lián)邦基金利率在3%左右。
未來(lái)一到兩年的大部分時(shí)間內(nèi)，R*可能都會(huì)比0.5%要高。目前，聯(lián)邦基金利率約為5.5%，通脹約為3%，也就是隱含的實(shí)際利率至少有2.5%。它會(huì)下降，但可能要到2025年末、2026年初前后才能回到R*。
在那之前，除非美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)顯著放緩，否則實(shí)際利率將會(huì)維持在高位。等美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)降息、實(shí)際利率回落后，我們就有更合適的條件去評(píng)估R*到底在哪里，但可能確實(shí)會(huì)比疫情前略高一些。
Q9：高利率如何影響實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)？
Nathan SHEETS：長(zhǎng)期利率是貨幣政策向經(jīng)濟(jì)傳導(dǎo)的有力渠道。
利率對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)傳導(dǎo)的首要發(fā)力點(diǎn)是按揭貸款市場(chǎng)。和許多其他國(guó)家不同，美國(guó)有長(zhǎng)期固定利率按揭貸款，所以，利率上升并不會(huì)馬上影響居民的存量貸款，但這并不意味著其對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)沒(méi)有沖擊，因?yàn)槿绻用褚I房、要搬家，要申請(qǐng)新的貸款，就會(huì)面臨更高的利率。
此外，目前的利率水平比以前高了很多，這就意味著很多借了低息按揭貸款的人無(wú)法賣房搬家，因?yàn)樗麄兘璨黄鹦碌馁J款。所以，美國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的交易量在萎縮，這對(duì)市場(chǎng)的量、價(jià)以及需要買房的人來(lái)說(shuō)都是挑戰(zhàn)。
除了按揭貸款這個(gè)主要渠道以外，利率攀升也會(huì)影響消費(fèi)者（比如買車）以及企業(yè)（的投資、籌資和增長(zhǎng)策略等）。
最后，高利率還會(huì)給銀行系統(tǒng)帶來(lái)困難和挑戰(zhàn)，包括如何管理資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上的利率風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。很多金融機(jī)構(gòu)在本輪加息周期之前的十年里買了不少長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)，而現(xiàn)在這些長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)已經(jīng)開始產(chǎn)生損失，銀行必須進(jìn)行應(yīng)對(duì)。
同理，曲線上各個(gè)位置的利率都在攀升，意味著銀行的存款利息成本也會(huì)升高，從而加劇其資金壓力。當(dāng)然，利率高對(duì)儲(chǔ)戶、有養(yǎng)老金賬戶的人、退休的家庭來(lái)說(shuō)是好事，而且現(xiàn)在很多美國(guó)人更多依賴于存款。因此，高利率有利有弊，但確實(shí)對(duì)銀行造成流動(dòng)性和資金方面的壓力。
美債收益率面臨雙向風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 政府赤字和債務(wù)壓力沖擊實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)
Q10：您如何預(yù)期2024年美債利率走勢(shì)？如何評(píng)估美國(guó)政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)？
Nathan SHEETS：近期，影響10年期美債收益率宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素主要有三個(gè)。
第一，對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退前景與概率的預(yù)期發(fā)生變化。2023年夏天，市場(chǎng)開始降低對(duì)衰退的預(yù)期，導(dǎo)致美債收益率攀升。
第二，與經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)相關(guān)的，是市場(chǎng)對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)及貨幣政策預(yù)期的變化。2023年夏天，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)一直釋放的信號(hào)是利率將在更長(zhǎng)時(shí)間內(nèi)維持在高位，繼續(xù)實(shí)施緊縮貨幣政策。而近來(lái)，隨著通脹放緩，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策立場(chǎng)也在緩和。這是導(dǎo)致10年期美債收益率回落的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵解釋變量。
第三，影響2023年美債收益率的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素是美國(guó)公共部門的高赤字和高債務(wù)。從8月上旬起，尤其是在債務(wù)上限談判僵局、惠譽(yù)下調(diào)美國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)以及美財(cái)政部宣布將大量發(fā)債以后，10年期美債收益率大幅上漲。
過(guò)去三到六個(gè)月來(lái)，我親身感受到國(guó)際投資者問(wèn)得最多的問(wèn)題就是，美國(guó)發(fā)行那么多的國(guó)債，到底誰(shuí)來(lái)買？這是個(gè)核心問(wèn)題。也由此，我認(rèn)為這種對(duì)于發(fā)債的擔(dān)憂體現(xiàn)為了美債的一部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)，這部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)也反映在了10年期美債收益率的走勢(shì)里。最近，對(duì)于發(fā)債的擔(dān)憂有所緩解，10年期美債收益率回落至4%以下。
鑒于美債目前的情況，我無(wú)法非常明確地判斷其2024年的走勢(shì)。目前的位置整體上與宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)基本面相符。市場(chǎng)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況、美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策和債務(wù)情況如何演變的認(rèn)知是否會(huì)經(jīng)歷一定的波動(dòng)？肯定會(huì)的。但從目前位置看，美債收益率仍面臨雙向風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
Q11：美國(guó)政府赤字和債務(wù)問(wèn)題的長(zhǎng)期累積，是否會(huì)在2024年給美國(guó)利率水平、實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融市場(chǎng)帶來(lái)實(shí)質(zhì)性擾動(dòng)？
Nathan SHEETS：美國(guó)財(cái)政赤字處在非常高的水平。據(jù)美國(guó)政府與國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室估算，未來(lái)十年內(nèi)，美國(guó)財(cái)政赤字占GDP的比重或高達(dá)5.5%-6%。如果把這些赤字加起來(lái)，相當(dāng)于這十年美國(guó)財(cái)政部要發(fā)20萬(wàn)億美元規(guī)模的國(guó)債，這是一個(gè)非常大的數(shù)字。
政府赤字對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響是一個(gè)很重要的問(wèn)題。我們一般用“擠出效應(yīng)”來(lái)描述這種影響。美國(guó)國(guó)債在市場(chǎng)里流通、美國(guó)政府由此借到錢的同時(shí)，意味著流向經(jīng)濟(jì)其他組成部分的資金就會(huì)變少，包括想要借錢的企業(yè)、家庭等。美債把后者從市場(chǎng)里擠出，而這最終意味著其他的借貸者還要支付更高的利息。隨著借貸成本提高和潛在的利率攀升，經(jīng)濟(jì)增速就會(huì)放緩。
在疫情之前的十年內(nèi)，盡管美國(guó)政府赤字也很高，但這種擠出效應(yīng)并不十分顯著。第一個(gè)原因在于，當(dāng)時(shí)的財(cái)政赤字與現(xiàn)在相比還不算太高；第二，當(dāng)時(shí)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)實(shí)施了刺激性的貨幣政策，抵消了財(cái)政赤字和美債發(fā)行產(chǎn)生的影響。我的觀點(diǎn)是，目前及未來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)情況會(huì)有所不同，通脹會(huì)更合意，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將不需要實(shí)施刺激性過(guò)強(qiáng)的貨幣政策。所以，我們未來(lái)可能面臨更加顯著的擠出效應(yīng)。
此外，高赤字和高債務(wù)還通過(guò)另一個(gè)傳導(dǎo)渠道影響實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，看到政府債務(wù)水平如此之高，家庭和企業(yè)將會(huì)產(chǎn)生緊張情緒，擔(dān)憂政府債務(wù)高企可能會(huì)在將來(lái)構(gòu)成問(wèn)題，例如隨之而來(lái)的增稅。然后，家庭和企業(yè)的想法便是，“既然以后可能要交更多的稅，那么不如現(xiàn)在少花點(diǎn)錢?！焙暧^經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中，這叫做“李嘉圖等價(jià)定理”。
一般來(lái)說(shuō)，美國(guó)消費(fèi)者的行為模式往往不符合李嘉圖等價(jià)定理的規(guī)律。但我們以前也沒(méi)經(jīng)歷過(guò)如此高水平的債務(wù)和赤字。整體而言，當(dāng)政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)攀升時(shí)，會(huì)讓人們更緊張，從而加劇整體的不確定性。我研究了過(guò)去幾十年大量國(guó)家的宏觀數(shù)據(jù)以后發(fā)現(xiàn)，公共債務(wù)高企的時(shí)候，私營(yíng)部門就會(huì)變得更加緊張，這會(huì)抑制消費(fèi)和總需求，從而拖累經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。
最后，隨著政府債務(wù)增長(zhǎng)，一旦發(fā)生負(fù)面沖擊，政府的應(yīng)對(duì)能力會(huì)很有限，因?yàn)槠鋫鶆?wù)規(guī)模是有上限的。此外，政府可能還想推動(dòng)一些戰(zhàn)略性的公共投資、人力資本投資等，但如果已經(jīng)面臨巨額赤字和債務(wù)，財(cái)政政策已經(jīng)失調(diào)，那么投資的空間也會(huì)更有限。
綜合來(lái)看，政府赤字和債務(wù)問(wèn)題或?qū)⑼ㄟ^(guò)影響市場(chǎng)信心等多種渠道導(dǎo)致擠出效應(yīng)、加劇不確定性。這將帶來(lái)諸多挑戰(zhàn)，對(duì)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)構(gòu)成風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并對(duì)未來(lái)的財(cái)政政策構(gòu)成掣肘。
美元存在持久、大幅下調(diào)可能 新興市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體及其央行表現(xiàn)超出預(yù)期
Q12：您如何預(yù)測(cè)2024年美元匯率走勢(shì)及美元流動(dòng)性的變化趨勢(shì)？非美元市場(chǎng)尤其是新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家面臨哪些機(jī)遇和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)？
Nathan SHEETS：近年來(lái)美元非常強(qiáng)勁，這一現(xiàn)象反映了兩個(gè)事實(shí)：一是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)相對(duì)強(qiáng)勁，二是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)相對(duì)激進(jìn)。
在即將進(jìn)入2024年之際，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)勢(shì)頭似乎依然不錯(cuò)，而美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的政策口吻已經(jīng)開始轉(zhuǎn)向。如果美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)開始放緩，我確實(shí)認(rèn)為美元會(huì)有較大的下調(diào)空間。從我跟蹤的幾個(gè)關(guān)鍵指標(biāo)來(lái)看，美元現(xiàn)在處于很高的位置，鑒于此，其后續(xù)的下調(diào)可能會(huì)比較持久、幅度也會(huì)較大。
至于下調(diào)的時(shí)點(diǎn)，我認(rèn)為可能是在2024年下半年或2025年上半年。一旦調(diào)整開始，我認(rèn)為就會(huì)比較劇烈，所以在不遠(yuǎn)的未來(lái)，我們將會(huì)看到外匯市場(chǎng)回調(diào)。
至于新興市場(chǎng)，實(shí)際上過(guò)去幾年來(lái)新興市場(chǎng)的表現(xiàn)非常不錯(cuò)，尤其是一些拉美國(guó)家的央行以及中東歐國(guó)家的央行，它們比美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)更積極、更早地啟動(dòng)了緊縮進(jìn)程。
尤其是在2021年，當(dāng)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席鮑威爾和歐央行行長(zhǎng)拉加德還在討論通脹的“暫時(shí)性”時(shí)，很多新興市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體央行已經(jīng)開始加息并在降通脹方面取得進(jìn)展，這增強(qiáng)了其自身的信譽(yù)。這些經(jīng)濟(jì)體的通脹也比全球其他地區(qū)更早回落。目前，部分新興市場(chǎng)央行已經(jīng)開始降息。所以，現(xiàn)在我們對(duì)新興市場(chǎng)的看法是很積極的。
同樣，亞洲新興市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體及其央行的表現(xiàn)好于我的預(yù)期，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)也從中受益，那些高度依賴外貿(mào)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體也同樣受益。如果更細(xì)致地去看每個(gè)新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家，包括巴西、墨西哥、印度等，會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)其中不少都很積極、很令人鼓舞。所以，在發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體以外，存在著廣闊的機(jī)會(huì)。
2024年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)或較為疲軟 關(guān)鍵在于恢復(fù)強(qiáng)勁需求和家庭部門消費(fèi)
Q13：您如何預(yù)期2024年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)形勢(shì)，特別是歐洲和日本的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)？
Nathan SHEETS：我們對(duì)2024年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的展望比較謹(jǐn)慎。美國(guó)方面如前所述。
歐洲方面，目前處于衰退之中。歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)在2023年第三季度溫和收縮，我們認(rèn)為其將在第四季度和2024年第一季度繼續(xù)收縮。即使歐元區(qū)重回?cái)U(kuò)張區(qū)間，漲幅估計(jì)也不會(huì)太大。整體來(lái)看，我們認(rèn)為歐元區(qū)面臨著諸多周期性和結(jié)構(gòu)性挑戰(zhàn)，所以預(yù)測(cè)也非常謹(jǐn)慎。
中國(guó)方面，我們認(rèn)為其經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)接近預(yù)期目標(biāo)，2023年為5%左右，2024年或?qū)⒃?%-4.5%左右，具體數(shù)字還需結(jié)合2024年增速目標(biāo)來(lái)看，整體上呈現(xiàn)溫和增長(zhǎng)。中國(guó)的居民消費(fèi)可能呈現(xiàn)溫和擴(kuò)張而非強(qiáng)勁擴(kuò)張，中國(guó)有能力推出足夠的政策支持以實(shí)現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)。
但同時(shí)，我們也在密切關(guān)注中國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)，這是金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和經(jīng)濟(jì)下行壓力的一個(gè)主要來(lái)源。在我們的基準(zhǔn)預(yù)測(cè)情形中，中國(guó)政府將成功地遏制住房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的下滑，這樣的話，即使這個(gè)行業(yè)無(wú)法成為促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的動(dòng)力，也不至于對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)金融穩(wěn)定構(gòu)成威脅。
日本方面，在2023年上半年，隨著疫情后的重啟，日本經(jīng)歷了強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇。近期日本經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)勢(shì)頭有所放緩，或許2024年增速將較上年下降，而日本政府也準(zhǔn)備進(jìn)一步推出刺激政策以提振經(jīng)濟(jì)。綜上，我們認(rèn)為2024年日本經(jīng)濟(jì)增速在1%左右或略低于1%，也屬溫和增長(zhǎng)。
可以看出，日本2024年的增長(zhǎng)前景相對(duì)于其趨勢(shì)水平和中國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)前景相對(duì)于其趨勢(shì)水平類似。事實(shí)上，這也是我們對(duì)于整個(gè)亞洲的預(yù)測(cè)：增長(zhǎng)前景基本在趨勢(shì)水平附近，雖不引人注目，但是非常穩(wěn)健。
把上述估算納入整體預(yù)測(cè)來(lái)看，2024年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)確實(shí)可能相對(duì)疲軟，預(yù)計(jì)將較2023年下降0.5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)甚至更多。我們核算全球GDP的方法和國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）不完全一樣，比較來(lái)看，我們的預(yù)測(cè)比IMF略低一些，但不會(huì)低太多。
我認(rèn)為最大的自由變量依然是美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)。如果美國(guó)不經(jīng)歷衰退，我們的預(yù)測(cè)可能會(huì)比IMF高一點(diǎn)。
Q14：聚焦全球經(jīng)濟(jì)，哪些主要推動(dòng)力與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)點(diǎn)需要關(guān)注？地緣政治沖突、氣變行動(dòng)等變量是否可能導(dǎo)致全球經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)滯脹型衰退？
Nathan SHEETS：2024年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)面臨的一個(gè)主要挑戰(zhàn)是地緣政治，包括俄烏沖突和中東沖突。此外，我們還將中美關(guān)系的發(fā)展軌跡視為全球增長(zhǎng)的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵驅(qū)動(dòng)力，這對(duì)于兩國(guó)乃至全球經(jīng)濟(jì)都具有重要意義。
另一個(gè)影響金融市場(chǎng)的關(guān)鍵因素是，2024年會(huì)有不少國(guó)家進(jìn)行大選，包括美國(guó)的總統(tǒng)大選。大選結(jié)果將對(duì)地緣政治格局、國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)政策、央行官員任命等諸多方面產(chǎn)生重要影響。
總體來(lái)看，我預(yù)計(jì)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)可以被定義為“滯脹”的情況。在當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)周期里，供應(yīng)鏈沖擊已顯著緩解。比起供應(yīng)沖擊，現(xiàn)在經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨的主要挑戰(zhàn)可能更多地在于是否有強(qiáng)勁需求和家庭部門消費(fèi)。
此外，還有一些更為長(zhǎng)期的因素，包括凈零轉(zhuǎn)型。如果各國(guó)更加嚴(yán)肅地對(duì)待凈零轉(zhuǎn)型，推出碳稅等措施，可能會(huì)引發(fā)一定程度的供應(yīng)沖擊。此外，凈零轉(zhuǎn)型過(guò)程中，還需要刺激對(duì)投資品的需求以及投資支出，這可能會(huì)提振總需求。所以，總地來(lái)說(shuō)，凈零轉(zhuǎn)型會(huì)使增長(zhǎng)變得更加復(fù)雜，但我的感覺是，可能還需要幾年的時(shí)間，凈零排放方面的考慮因素才會(huì)真正成熟，并在我們的預(yù)測(cè)中占據(jù)重要位置。
目前，我們考慮的更多還是需求，和地緣政治、國(guó)內(nèi)政治及其對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的外溢效應(yīng)等。這些也是我未來(lái)一年會(huì)密切關(guān)注的方面。
Q15：對(duì)于以上挑戰(zhàn)，各國(guó)央行在協(xié)調(diào)合作方面還可以做出哪些努力？
Nathan SHEETS：對(duì)于各國(guó)央行的協(xié)調(diào)合作，我的首要建議是，央行要專注于核心使命，即穩(wěn)定物價(jià)。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)有雙重使命，除了價(jià)格穩(wěn)定，還有充分就業(yè)。央行政策制定者很容易被諸多其他因素分散注意力。但央行能給公眾帶來(lái)最好結(jié)果的方式就是保持對(duì)核心使命的專注。
專注于通脹及應(yīng)對(duì)通脹的政策也是各國(guó)央行協(xié)調(diào)的關(guān)鍵。我很高興地看到，各國(guó)央行之間維持著定期的溝通，彼此交流對(duì)于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的看法，互相更新自己的政策和情況。比如，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)官員開會(huì)時(shí)，對(duì)歐央行行長(zhǎng)的想法是有著深入了解的，也對(duì)歐央行、中國(guó)央行和日本央行對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的看法有著了解，反之亦然。我認(rèn)為這是合適的協(xié)調(diào)。
由于各國(guó)央行的國(guó)內(nèi)政策目標(biāo)不盡相同，更加正式的政策協(xié)調(diào)可能并不可行，甚至并不可取。整體而言，各國(guó)央行要專注于國(guó)內(nèi)的通脹使命，同時(shí)，彼此間就政策、經(jīng)濟(jì)等各方面情況保持溝通，這樣，在制定政策時(shí)能夠參考一致的、充分的信息。
預(yù)計(jì)日央行會(huì)較晚采取行動(dòng)
Q16：您如何展望日本央行貨幣政策在2024年取得實(shí)質(zhì)性轉(zhuǎn)折的可能性？日本退出負(fù)利率，將如何影響全球利率體系與金融市場(chǎng)？
Nathan SHEETS：日本央行的貨幣政策主要涉及兩方面。
一是收益率曲線控制（YCC）政策。日央行已經(jīng)開始采取一些顯著舉措以求逐步退出YCC。但從理論上看，退出YCC是非常棘手的。事實(shí)上，15年前，在全球金融危機(jī)期間，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)曾考慮過(guò)推出與YCC非常類似的政策，但最終沒(méi)有采取這一策略，原因就是不知道應(yīng)該如何退出。所以，日央行過(guò)去一年來(lái)能夠相對(duì)平穩(wěn)地在退出YCC方面取得進(jìn)展是值得稱贊的。
二是負(fù)利率。我認(rèn)為，日本央行想要恢復(fù)利率正常化，至少要使政策利率回歸到0或略高于0的水平。正常化的具體時(shí)點(diǎn)則受到全球經(jīng)濟(jì)、外匯市場(chǎng)乃至美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策走向的影響。
因此，日本央行何時(shí)邁出退出YCC政策或?qū)⒗噬?的最后一步，仍存在很大的不確定性，最早可能馬上就會(huì)發(fā)生，最晚可能要等到2025年春季，具體還要看全球經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況等各種因素。
不過(guò)，我確實(shí)認(rèn)為，市場(chǎng)正期待日本央行在這些方面采取行動(dòng)。只要你步入了央行或市場(chǎng)之中，就會(huì)有無(wú)數(shù)雙眼睛盯著你，期待你做些什么，而日本央行需要做什么是顯而易見的。這種機(jī)制也會(huì)在一定程度上加速央行行動(dòng)。
我個(gè)人更傾向于認(rèn)為，日央行還是會(huì)較晚采取行動(dòng)。我們的正式預(yù)測(cè)也是這樣。最晚可能會(huì)在2025年初，這其中仍有很多不確定性，但最終一定會(huì)發(fā)生。
英文訪談紀(jì)要
Q1: How do you take stock of the U.S. economic outlook in 2024? Although the worries on recession seem to have subdued, there are still some who suggest that a recession may be inevitable for the U.S. to bring inflation back to target. What is your take on that?
Nathan Sheets ：The U.S. economy has been extremely resilient over the last several years. As 2023 began, I was expecting a recession in the year. Instead, we've seen above-trend growth from the United States.
The key to the strength of the U.S. economy has been a cycle where consumer spending, particularly on services, has been very strong. That strong services spending by the consumer was then supporting the labor market and the demand for workers, and putting upward pressure on wages. As wage growth has risen, that's further reinforced the strength of spending in the economy. So, in some sense, the U.S. has had a virtuous circle.
Are we seeing some of the services spending starting to slow? Are we seeing some evidence that the labor market might be softening a notch? I would say “yes”, but it's all in the sense of moving from very strong restraint down to more moderate restraint. We still see solid indications of where the economy is. And I don't see anything at the moment that convinces me that a U.S. recession is around the corner.
Our formal call for some time has been for a recession in the middle of 2024. But the data do not support it. As a result of that, the expectation between recession and soft landing is very finely balanced.
Finally, one of the reasons why I've continued to expect a recession is because historically, when inflation has been this rapid, and when wage growth has been this high, part of the process of bringing them back down to more sustainable paces and bringing the economy back into balance has been a loosening of the labor market and increase in the unemployment rate in a period of recession. So, historically, that's been a feature of disinflation, and it very much remains to be seen whether this time is different, but that really is the big question for 2024.
Our formal forecast for U.S. GDP growth for 2024 is a 1% rate. That is down from over 2% in 2023. But it also embeds in it the view that there will be a recession. If there's no U.S. recession, then I think 2% plus, for various reasons, is likely to be where we're going to land.
But when I look at various countries around the world, the one where I think there is the most uncertainty in terms of its performance is the United States, where I have two distinct scenarios. One is there a recession. I know that many Fed watchers, U.S. analysts, and markets are saying no, but for the reasons I've described, I'm less convinced. If there is a recession, 1% growth or less is likely. If there's not a recession, then it's going to be another year similar to 2023, where the economy is pretty solid with growth in the neighborhood of 2% plus/minus a few ten-s.
So, there is still a wide range of outcomes. But I was surprised on the upside in 2023, and I'll be happy to be surprised on the upside in 2024.
Q2: Why hasn't the fight against inflation this time plunged the U.S. economy into recession? What has made it different?
Nathan Sheets ：That's probably the question I've spent the most time thinking about in 2023. If you’d ask me two years ago that, if the Fed is going to hike rates by more than 500 basis points over roughly an 18-month period, what will be the implications for the U.S. economy and the global economy? I would say the implications of such a rapid hike in such a short period are going to be very severe—certainly recession, financial market stresses, challenges, difficulties, and so forth. And in the event the economy has absorbed the Fed's tightening surprisingly well, what's going on? I think there are a couple of things.
First, I mentioned the strong consumer demand for services. A lot of that demand is pent-up demand that was accumulated during the pandemic. During the pandemic, U.S. consumers weren't consuming as much on services, travel, leisure, hospitality, entertainment, or going to restaurants. Then, coming out of the pandemic, there's been this very price-insensitive, interest-rate-insensitive demand. Consumers were determined to do it, regardless of the broader economic circumstances.
Consistent with that, there was also a fair amount of pent-up or accumulated savings in the economy as a result of the pandemic that they could use to finance these expenditures. So, we had this big quantum of demand for services that the Fed's tightening just has not slowed appreciably. That's one key factor.
The second key factor is that, during the decade preceding the Fed's rate hikes, we had very loose monetary policy and very low rates. During that period of time, households and firms took advantage of the low rates to refinance their mortgages and debt obligations. And a key feature the U.S. economy is we have these 30-year fixed rate mortgages that don't adjust as the Fed hikes. As a result of that, the U.S. household sector has largely been insulated from the effects of Fed rate hikes. People, firms and households have termed out their debt, and the Fed's hiking has not had the same effect that it would have had otherwise.
A final point that's more structural and longer term is the economy is increasingly about services, and services sectors are less capital-intensive, less about borrowing for investment, and therefore, less sensitive to Fed rate hikes.
So, those are the three key factors that I would point to in explaining the insensitivity of the economy. But the bottom line is that the U.S. economy has been remarkable and quite surprising.
One other related argument is whether all of this means that the lags for monetary policy have already played through and the effects of Fed rate hikes have already affected the economy, or if it means that the lags are simply longer than they were before, and the Fed's policies will eventually bite—it will just be more slowly over time.
I think the jury is still out on that question. I would lean more toward a longer-lag scenario, largely because all of that debt that is termed out eventually will need to be refinanced. People will eventually need to take out new mortgages, and firms will need to refinance debt as it comes due.
Similarly, over a couple of quarters, we'll see the pent-up demand for services play through. It's moving in that direction, and it should be completed at some point—in my mind, likely in the first half of 2024.
Q3: Do you think the Fed is pivoting is paramount target from curbing inflation to delivering a soft landing? Or should it do so? And what implications would that policy change have?
Nathan Sheets ：I think that the Fed is pivoting. Many people have used that word to describe Jerome Powell’s December press conference. I think that is appropriate.
In previous press conferences, Jerome Powell has said that the Fed’s first objective is to bring inflation down. As its seeks to bring inflation down, it’s going to try to get policy right, and ensure that it's neither too tight nor too loose. But if it is going to make a mistake, it is going to make the mistake of being too aggressive and making sure that it fights inflation and extinguishes inflation from the economy.
At the press conference in December 2023, Jerome Powell was asked a very similar question, and instead, he emphasized how hard they would try to avoid a policy where it proved to be too aggressive. It was a very different tone than the previous press conferences, and it does lead me to believe that with inflation now on its path—at least down to the high-twos—that the Fed is waiting, bringing down inflation, and protecting the economy much more equally than had been the case before. It further leads me to think that the Fed is saying, “l(fā)ook, high-twos inflation versus a recession is not a good trade-off.” So, I think they are in that process of pivoting.
You also asked whether I think that's the right thing to do. I would have been comfortable with the Fed being a little bit more gradual in implementing that pivot than what we saw. It felt like just a very abrupt shift in Federal Reserve policy. As a result of that, the financial markets have focused on the December press conference, and we've seen a substantial easing in financial conditions, which are a key channel through which Fed policy gets transmitted. As financial conditions ease, that means the restraint and the traction of Fed policy on the economy diminishes. Ironically, as the markets are jubilant and rise, it makes it harder for the Fed to achieve its objectives.
So, I can understand, under these circumstances, why the tone of Federal Reserve policy and communication shifted at the December meeting, but I think it would have been better if it had shifted a notch at the meeting. There may be a notch in the spring and another in the summer, as opposed to flipping three notches all at once. It was a very acute shift in his communication across a broad range of topics.
Q4: Do you think it's safe to say that the Fed is gaining victory against inflation?
Nathan Sheets ：The trajectory of inflation has been front and center in the Fed’s thinking. The Fed has made significant progress in bringing down inflation. Specifically, core PCE inflation, which is the Fed preferred measure and peaked in 2022 at around 5.5%, is currently running at around 3.5%. But given the data that we're expecting over the next few months and other technical factors, it's very likely that by early 2024, the Fed's preferred measure of inflation will be a bit below 3%.
So, we have seen some appreciable progress from the mid-fives down to 3% or even lower in the Fed's preferred measure of inflation. I think that's giving the Fed a lot of satisfaction - we heard that from Jerome Powell in his recent press conference.
Now, I think the big question that many analysts are still debating and remains to be seen is, is this final chapter of inflation coming down from very high levels back to the Fed's 2% target likely to resemble the previous chapters? Or, is it likely to be more challenging?
My feeling has long been that the final part of inflation is more about services inflation, and bringing down the demand for services—which has been strong for a variety of reasons, but especially because of that pent-up demand—may require a broader loosening of the labor market and a higher unemployment rate in recession. It may be more painful than the disinflation that we've seen so far, which has mainly been about falling goods prices driven by healing of global supply chains, weakness in global goods demand, and declining commodity prices.
There's a lot of uncertainty about what this last chapter of disinflation looks like. But so far, the Fed has made significant progress, in my view, bringing inflation back down. It's just how hard that last percentage is likely to be.
Q5: What is your outlook for the inflation in the U.S. in the coming 1-2 years? How long do you think it'll take for it to fall back to target?
Nathan Sheets ：My expectation is that this last percentage point getting from 3% to 2% is likely to be challenging. It's likely to be more painful. It's likely to require deeper adjustments in the labor market and potentially a higher unemployment rate than we've seen so far.
Given that reality, it's likely to be a longer slog. I would not expect necessarily to see 2.0% inflation in 2024—I think it’s more likely to be achieved in 2025. Having said that, from where we are today back to 2%, we will see some gradual progress through 2024. I just think this last leg of inflation is going to be the most challenging and the most difficult.
I also think it's going to highlight a related question, which is, as inflation falls into that 2-3% range, how hard is the Fed going to fight that? At the point where inflation has a 2-handle, 2.9%, 2.8%, 2.7%, as it's in that range, is the Fed really willing to stay as tight and risk a recession to bring inflation from 2.9%, 2.8% or 2.7% back down to 2%? Or will the Fed start taking its foot off the brake?
At his recent press conference, Jerome Powell was signaling that the appetite for further monetary restraint and high rates is more limited than I would have thought. It may be that the Fed itself is signaling that it's willing to allow some time to get back to 2% inflation rate. I think, ultimately, the Fed will be happy to give itself as much time as inflation expectations will allow it. And I really think that the Fed's guiding principle, or its north star, in this process of disinflation, is inflation expectations. If inflation expectations are staying well-anchored at around 2%, then that gives the Fed plenty of freedom to be very gradual in bringing inflation back down.
So, there are lots of considerations, but I think both from a macro view and thinking about the Fed's monetary policy strategy, the progress on inflation is likely to be much, much slower from here.
Q6: Do you think inflation can or needs to fall back to the 2% target from a pragmatic point of view?
Nathan Sheets ：That is a critical question. If you asked 15 macro economists where the optimal inflation target is for the United States, I think the preponderance of people would say something more like 3%, rather than 2%. So, from that perspective, you can argue that it's not even the optimal solution for the Fed. Then, why should the Fed sacrifice economic growth and employment to achieve it?
But on the other hand - economists are famous for having two hands - the key attraction for the Fed to 2% and the core of its obligation to get back to 2% is indeed a very pragmatic consideration, and that’s that the Fed has committed to a 2% inflation target.
Why does the Fed need to get back to 2%? It’s not so much that 2% is better than 3%, but because it's promised the public, the markets and the world that it will get inflation back to 2%. So, it becomes a matter of Federal Reserve credibility. So, I do think they need to get back there.
But as I've said, how fast you get back to 2% can be governed by how much space the markets are giving the Fed to operate. And that space is determined by inflation expectations and how well-anchored they are, which, in turn, reflects Fed credibility. So, the Fed is credible. It can give itself more time and sacrifice less employment, growth and economic activity on its way back.
In this cycle, it's important for both pragmatic and policy reasons to get back to 2%. Over time, maybe the Fed will reconsider its inflation target, but for now, 2% is where they need to go.
Q7: Do you have any concrete prediction of the Fed’s monetary policy move in 2024?
Nathan Sheets ：My view about the U.S. economy is that, as a result of monetary policy lags and the fact that services inflation remains challenging, there is still a recession risk in the economy. In the event of recession, the Fed is likely to be cutting fairly aggressively, I would say 100 basis points or more, most likely in the second half of 2024.
However, in the soft-landing scenario that Jerome Powell and his colleagues are envisioning, I think we've got to take them at their word that a reasonable baseline is 75 basis points of rate cuts.
Any way the Fed cuts it, regardless of where the economy goes—if it's soft landing, then three cuts as the Fed is saying; if it's recession, I'd say four cuts or maybe more than that—we should prepare ourselves for some easing of U.S. monetary conditions in 2024.
Now, an important point—it's one that the Fed has alluded to and one of the reasons why in the soft landing scenario it would have three rate cuts—is that as inflation comes down, if the Fed funds rate is not adjusted, then that implied real rate meaning the difference between the Fed funds rate and inflation will rise. So, what the Fed does is it cuts just to accommodate lower inflation. And in some sense, I think the Fed would argue that's not an easing of financial conditions and not an easing of monetary policy.
But in any of that, it is a right cut. I think people in the markets at least are not going to be differentiating adjustments due to real rates and those for other factors. So, the bottom line is that there will be rate cuts in 2024, and they're likely to be appreciable.
Q8: What is your outlook for the real rate in the U.S. in the coming 1 to 2 years?
Nathan Sheets ：This is a great question. One of the big debates in the U.S. regarding the economy is where “R*” has moved.
R* is the real rate that's associated with the economy being at a steady state or an equilibrium. Pre-pandemic, it was widely believed that R* was at around 0.5%. Or, with 2% inflation, a 0.5% R* suggested a neutral nominal Fed funds rate of around 2.5%.
Now, that's still what the Fed has in its projections, and so the Fed has continued to signal R* of around 0.5% and a neutral funds rate of roughly 2.5%. I think it's broadly agreed that—for various reasons, including shifts in the economy, slower pace of globalization, the demands of net-zero transition for capital, implications of aging demographics, and maybe just some normalization—R* has probably risen a bit.
My instinct is that it hasn't risen a lot. I don't think we have evidence of that. But could R* now be around 1% rather than 0.5%, suggesting that neutral debt funds rate is at around 3%? I think that's the right story.
To focus on the next year or two, through a lot of that period, I think we will see a real interest rate that's higher than that. Right now, we're having an implied real rate of at least 2.5%, with the Fed funds rate of around 5.5% and inflation running around 3%. It will be coming down, but I wouldn't expect it to fall back to that R* rate until late 2025 or early 2026.
Unless the economy slows very appreciably, this will be a period where real rates are elevated. And then once they get back as the Fed is cutting, then we will be in a better place to be able to evaluate where that R*, that equilibrium, steady-state concept really is, but it’s probably a little higher than it was before the pandemic.
Q9: How are the higher interest rates influencing the economy?
Nathan Sheets ：The reality is that longer-term rates are very powerful channels of transmission into the economy for monetary policy. But more broadly, it really is that spot on the curve out around that 10-year point that’s particularly critical.
I think the number one and the most important point of traction from rates into the economies is through the mortgage market.
Unlike many other countries, the United States has long-term fixed rate mortgages, so it's not like higher interest rates today roll in to everybody's mortgage tomorrow. But it is very impactful on the economy—anyone who needs to take out a new mortgage, anybody that needs to move, and anyone who wants to buy a house is now looking at substantially higher interest rates.
Another place where it's manifesting itself is, as a result of these 30-year mortgages that people have and the fact that rates are so much higher, many people who have low mortgage rates are unable to sell their houses and move, because they can't afford to take on a new mortgage. So, we have reduced volumes of transactions in the U.S. housing market, which is creating challenges for pricing and volume and people looking for new homes.
The principal channel of transmission is into mortgages, but higher rates along the curve also influence consumers in other ways as they seek to borrow, for example, to purchase a car, and has substantial implications for firms as they think about investment and financing their operations and growing their businesses.
Finally, this higher rate environment that we're in also creates conundrums and challenges for the banking system, as they think about managing interest rate risk on their balance sheets. Many financial institutions bought long-duration assets in that decade before the Fed's rate hikes started. Those long-duration assets that they purchased during those periods now have losses associated with them. And banks will have to manage that.
Similarly, with higher rates at various points of the curve, it also means that banks are paying more on deposits, and that creates funding pressures for the banks. That's good news for people who own those deposits, pensioners, retired households and others. And now, in the U.S., we're running more on our deposits. So, there are pluses and minuses associated with it, but it's a liquidity and financing challenge for the banks.
So, there are a number of places where these higher rates do impact families, as they think about buying houses and cars, influence what they earn on their deposits, and influence firms as they think about financing themselves, their ongoing operations, expanding their business and investing in capital.
Q10: How do you depict the trajectory of the U.S treasury yield in 2024? How do you evaluate the debt risk facing the Federal government?
Nathan Sheets ：The 10-year treasury yield has recently been influenced by three key macroeconomic factors.
First is shifting views on U.S. recession and the probability of a recession. Through the summer, investors were shifting to view the recession as less likely in the United States. That was a factor that was driving up Treasury yields.
Second, related to the performance of the economy, is the expectation of the markets as to how the Fed and its policies are likely to evolve. Notably, through the summer, the Fed was signaling higher-for-longer tight monetary policy. More recently, Fed policy, and relatedly inflation performance, has been easing. That's been a key explanatory variable in driving the 10-year treasury yield back down.
The third factor in play in 2023 that has influenced bond yields is concerns about the very high levels of U.S. debt and deficits in the public sector. It is notable that the 10-year Treasury yield shot upward, starting in early August, in particular following the debt ceiling standoff, following the Fitch downgrade and an announcement from the Treasury that there was going to be a lot of issuance.
As I’ve spoken to investors around the world over the last 3-6 months, the number one question I've heard is who's going to buy all of the debt? It is very much a front-and-center question. So, I think that there's been a risk premium reflecting concerns of that issuance and that’s also been in the 10-year treasury yield.
More recently, some of that concern is abated as the 10-year treasury yield is cut back below 4%. Given where it stands today, I don't have a strong view as to where it's likely to go in 2024. These current levels don't strike me as being significantly out of line with where I see macroeconomic fundamentals.
Could there be some more volatility in perceptions of where the economy is, where the Fed is, and how the debt situation evolves? Absolutely. But I think from where we are now, there are likely two-sided risks facing the treasury yields.
Q11: What is the influence of the federal deficit on the interest rate, the real economy, the financial market and households?
Nathan Sheets ：We have exceptionally high deficits in the United States. U.S. government and the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the deficit is likely to run around 5.5-6% of GDP a year for the coming decade. If you aggregate up all of those deficits, that suggests $20 trillion of treasury issuance over that period, which is a very substantial figure.
I think your question of what does all this mean for the economy is a very important one, and classically has been described by this term of “crowding out”. Specifically, as the treasury is in the markets borrowing substantially, it's taking funds that would otherwise go to other parts of the economy, including firms and households and others who might be interested in borrowing. It's taking them out, and it ultimately means that those other borrowers need to pay more. As a result of those higher costs of borrowing and potentially higher rates, the economy grows more slowly than would be the case otherwise.
Now, crowding out didn't really prevail during the decade before the pandemic, when we also had very high deficits. First, these deficits are larger. Second, the Fed's policy was very stimulative, and that helped offset a lot of the impact of the fiscal deficits and the issuance. My presumption is that the economy is going to be in a different place, and the Fed's policies will hopefully not need to be as stimulative, that inflation will be performing better, and the Fed won't need to be constantly priming the pump with more monetary policy support. So, there is a risk that we could see a crowding-out in the economy.
Let me also mention one other channel that may be at work. Households and firms, when they see very high debt levels, it tends to make them nervous. They look at those high debt levels and they say, “that could be a problem.” Maybe they start worrying that increase in taxes are down the road. They start to think that since taxes are going to get higher, maybe they need to spend a little less today to be ready for that in the future. There's a macro term called Ricardian Equivalence to describe that.
Typically, U.S. consumers aren't thought of behaving in a Ricardian fashion. But we also haven't seen debt and deficits quite like that. It could also create broader uncertainties where, when the government has this vulnerability, it makes people a little bit more nervous. When I look at the macro data across a broad range of countries over decades, I detect that the private sector gets a little bit nervous when public sector debt is high, and that ends up restraining spending and aggregate demand, and results in somewhat slower growth.
There are a variety of channels, including confidence, that result in crowding out and create uncertainty. It's an overhang on the economy, and all of those are headwinds and challenges.
The final point to make is that as the government's debt is higher, that means that if you have adverse developments, the government doesn't have as much space because there are limits to how high they want to go with the debt. Similarly, there might be strategic public investments and investments in human capital and others that the government should be making. But if your fiscal policy is already out of whack with large deficits and high debt, the scope to make those kinds of investments may be more limited.
So, I do think this is a serious question mark for the U.S. that could meaningfully constrain its fiscal policy going forward.
Q12: How do you think the US dollar and its liquidity would evolve in 2024? What are the risks and opportunities facing non-dollar markets, especially the emerging markets economies?
Nathan Sheets ：The dollar has been a very strong currency over the last couple of years. That is reflecting both the fact that the U.S. economy has been relatively resilient, and the fact that the Fed has been relatively aggressive.
As we move into 2024, the economy is still looking pretty good. But the tone of Federal Reserve policy is starting to shift. If we also start to have a slowing in the economy, I do think that there is meaningful scope for a further downward adjustment in the dollar, and given how elevated the dollar is by several key metrics that I follow, that downward adjustment could be quite sustained and quite significant.
As regards when it's going to happen, it may be more likely in the second half of 2024, then in the first half of 2025. But once it starts, I think it's likely to be significant. So, I would say that in the not-too-distant future, we're likely to see an adjustment in currency markets.
In terms of opportunities in emerging markets, I think the reality is that emerging markets, broadly speaking, have performed quite well over the last couple of years. Some of the Latin American central banks, in particular, and some in central and eastern Europe, hiked rates more vigorously and/or earlier than the Fed did.
Specifically, in 2021 when Jerome Powell and Madame Lagarde were still talking about “transitory inflation”, many of the emerging market economies central banks started to hike that allowed them to get traction on inflation. It reinforced their credibility. It's meant that inflation in those countries was coming down a little bit earlier than elsewhere. And several of those central banks have already started to cut rates. So, I think that we're in a place where sentiment toward emerging markets is pretty good.
Similarly, the global economy as a whole has benefited from a better performance of emerging Asian central banks and economies than what I would have expected. Those economies which are very heavily geared to trade have similarly benefited. As you delve down into more specific country-specific stories, including Brazil, Mexico and India, a number of those countries are very positive and encouraging.
So, I do think there are significant opportunities outside of the developed market world. And all of that is in addition to the opportunities and, admittedly, challenges that China's economy faces as well.
Q13: How do you envision global economic growth in 2024, especially the situation in Europe and Japan?
Nathan Sheets ：We were fairly restrained in our outlook.
When we look at the key regions, I've described the uncertainties surrounding the U.S. outlook. In Europe, the euro area is currently in a recession. The economy contracted mildly in Q3, and we think it will continue in Q4 and Q1, 2024. But even once the economy starts growing again, it's likely to be fairly restrained. There are lots of cyclical and structural challenges facing the euro area in our views. So, we're pretty cautious as we write down numbers for that part of the world.
In China, we see growth in the neighborhood of the growth target, 5% is for 2023, 4.5-5% for 2024, depending on where the growth target is set. Our sense is the Chinese consumer is now in a position where they're likely to be spending at a moderate, not strong, but a moderate pace. There will be enough stimulus to provide so that the growth target will be achieved.
That said, like many others, we’re watching the property sector very carefully. That is the downside risk and the source of stress. In our baseline scenario, we think the government will successfully put a floor under it, so that the property sector is not a major driver of growth, but it's also not a driver of financial stability risk for the economy.
So, for the U.S., we see lots of uncertainty; euro area, on the downside and soft; China, somewhere in between with moderate growth.
That's also I where I would put Japan. During the first part of 2023, Japan had a very strong rebound, largely due to reopening associated with Covid. More recently, the economy is taking a breather, pointing to a slower pace of performance in 2024. The government's preparing yet another stimulus package to provide support. Putting all of that together, our view is that Japanese growth is rather likely to be around 1% or maybe a little bit below that, so that’s moderate.
What I've described for Japan relative to its trend is pretty similar to China relative to its trend. And I think that's where we put Asia—it’s right around-trend growth, not spectacular, but a solid performance.
As we aggregate that into the global economy, we do end up with relatively soft performance, down maybe half a percentage point or more from 2023. We aggregate global GDP a little bit differently than the IMF does, but comparably, we would be a little bit weaker than the IMF but not appreciably so. Again, the biggest free variable in my mind is what happens in the United States. And if the U.S. doesn't have a recession, then our forecast would be a little bit above the IMF.
Q14: What are the most noteworthy forces driving or threatening global growth? Will variables including geopolitical tensions and climate actions push the world economy into stagflation?
Nathan Sheets ：One challenge for 2024 is the geopolitics, including what's going to happen with Russian and Ukraine as well as the middle east. We're also watching as a key driver of global growth the ongoing trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship, which could have very important implications for both our economies, but also for the world more generally.
Another key development for financial markets is there are going to be dozens of elections around the world during the coming year, including an election in the United States. The outcome of those elections is going to be very important in determining geopolitics and the stance of economic policies and which central bankers are appointed and a long list of other things. That's something I'm also watching.
All in all, I'm not expecting outcomes that I characterize as stagflationary. At this stage, in the cycle, a lot of the supply shocks that we were seeing have abated. And now it's more likely to be about the strength of demand and household spending, less than about supply shocks.
There obviously are longer term forces that are in play. You mentioned the net-zero effort, which if governments got really serious about and imposed a carbon tax, there could have a supply shock aspect to it. It's also going to require a lot of demand for investment goods, and a lot of spending on investment, and that's likely to strengthen aggregate demand. So, putting it all together, it becomes more complicated. But my sense is it’ll still probably takes some years down the road before net-zero considerations really mature and become front and center in our forecast.
For now, it's more about demand, geopolitics, domestic politics, and their spillovers into the global economy. Those are some of the things that I'm thinking about watching closely for the year ahead.
Q15: What suggestions would you give to global central banks to enhance coordination in response to the risks and challenges?
Nathan Sheets ：The number one suggestion I'd have for central banks is to stay focused on their mandates. And their mandates are for price stability, first and foremost. The Fed has a dual mandate for price stability and full employment.
It's very easy as a policymaker in a central bank to become distracted on a lot of other things. Bottom line: the way that central banks can deliver the best outcomes for the public is to stay riveted on those issues.
In terms of coordination, I think that focus on inflation and gearing policy to address it also frames out nicely the kind of coordination that needs to happen. The good news there is that central bankers meet regularly and exchange views and perspectives on what's happening in the global economy and updated each other. So, in the Fed's meeting, it has a pretty good idea as to how Madame Lagarde is thinking about things, as to how the ECB, the PBOC and the BOJ are viewing the world, and vice versa. I think that's the right degree of coordination.
Given these domestic mandates that various central banks have, more formal coordination of policy is probably not feasible and may not even be desirable. But, stay focused on those domestic mandates for inflation, and talk to each other and keep each other apprised on policy developments in various countries and economic developments, so that they can formulate policy with a broad set of information that's consistent with each other. That's what I'd emphasize in response to your question about the guidance for global central bankers.
Q16: Do you think it's likely that the BOJ will shift its monetary policy substantively in 2024? And how will it influence the global interest rate system of financial market if Japan is to exit from the negative interest rate policy?
Nathan Sheets ：I see the BOJ policy as having two principal prongs. The first prong is the yield curve control (YCC) strategy, where they've already taken some significant steps to back away from.
The exit from YCC is conceptually a very tricky endeavor. Indeed, 15 years ago during the global financial crisis, the Fed considered a policy that was very similar to YCC and ultimately decided not to adopt that kind of a strategy, because, as they were debating it, they couldn't figure out what the exit strategy would look like. How do you get out of it? So, the BOJ deserves many kudos for being able to make as much progress to exit from YCC as they have over the last year, to be able to do it in a relatively non-disruptive way.
Similarly, Japan has negative interest rates. My sense is that the BOJ would like to normalize policy, at least to the extent of bringing the policy rate back up to zero or just slightly positive. The exact timing of when that's going to happen depends a lot on the global economy, the trajectory of exchange markets, and maybe even how the Fed's policies evolve.
As a result of that, we see a broad range of possibilities as being in play as to when the BOJ will finally take the last step of exit from YCC and lift rates to zero. My sense is that it could happen as soon as imminently to as late as in the spring of 2025, depending on global conditions and how things evolve.
I do think, though, that the markets are looking to the BOJ to act in these respects. Once you're inside a central bank and the markets, eyes are upon you to do something, and it's clear what needs to be done. That tends to be a mechanism that accelerates action.
I personally would be surprised if it was sooner rather than later. Our formal call is a later exit, maybe as late as early 2025. There is lots of uncertainty around this, but it will happen. It's just a question of when, and that's going to be determined by the global economy, pressures on the exchange rate, Fed policy, and the like.
本文為CF40研究部對(duì)花旗集團(tuán)全球首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Nathan Sheets的專訪，未經(jīng)許可不得轉(zhuǎn)載。
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