首先我想感謝外灘金融峰會組委會對我的邀請。我還想說的是，很抱歉，在這樣的情況下，我不能前往上海參會，很遺憾錯過了這次豐富而熱烈的討論。
I want to begin by thanking the organizers of the Bund Summit for inviting me to participate. And I want to also say that I'm sorry the circumstances are such that I can't be in Shanghai to participate in person, and enjoy and benefit from the rich and lively discussion.
我要講的是中美之間的經(jīng)濟脫鉤。關(guān)于脫鉤的討論有很多。無論是在美國還是在中國，對于脫鉤話題的討論都非常常見。
I'm going to talk about the economic decoupling between China and the United States. There's certainly a lot of discussion about decoupling, I would say, both in the United States and in China, it's very, very widespread.
我想說兩個基本觀點。第一，熱衷討論脫鉤的人，大部分并沒有真正理解。實際上，他們大大低估了中美雙邊或者說中國與世界其他國家之間經(jīng)濟一體化的深度。換句話說，很大一部分關(guān)于脫鉤話題的討論都把問題簡單化了。
I want to make two fundamental points. One is that most of this discussion does not really understand, actually, substantially underestimates the depth of bilateral economic integration between China and the United States, or for that matter, between China and the rest of the world. In other words, a great deal of this discussion is fairly simplistic.
第二，我認為，在美國，也許在中國也是如此，倡導(dǎo)脫鉤的人會忽視，在某些情況下甚至?xí)裾J脫鉤將為雙方帶來的實際經(jīng)濟代價。
Secondly, I think certainly in the United States, and perhaps in China as well, advocates of decoupling ignore, or in some cases even deny, that decoupling involves real economic costs for both sides.
以美國為例，我們現(xiàn)在沒有相應(yīng)的政府機構(gòu)和部門來負責(zé)評估各種相關(guān)政策工具。比如關(guān)稅、對技術(shù)出口的限制，對外國投資流入的限制等等。我們沒有任何機構(gòu)去研究使用這些政策工具的成本，這些工具正被當(dāng)作政策使用來執(zhí)行某些層面的脫鉤。
And speaking of the United States, for example, we have no government agency or department that is charged with evaluating the policy tools such as tariffs, restrictions on the export of technology, restrictions on inflow of foreign investment, we have no agency that looks at what the costs of using those tools are, those are the tools that are being used as a policy matter to enforce certain types of decoupling.
但他們在使用這些工具時，并不了解其潛在成本，我不知道中國的情況如何，但我可以明確地說。在美國很少有人討論脫鉤帶來的成本問題。倡導(dǎo)脫鉤的人們熱衷于談?wù)撁撱^將會為美國帶來的實質(zhì)收益，但他們不愿意承認，脫鉤會導(dǎo)致美國付出重大的經(jīng)濟成本。
But they're being used without any understanding of the underlying costs. And I'm not sure what the situation is in China, but I can say categorically in the US, there has been very little discussion about the cost of decoupling.
Advocates of decoupling think that there are some substantial gains, which they talk about, but they're unwilling to recognize that are significant economic costs.
請看第二頁的第一張幻燈片，我想和大家討論一下實體經(jīng)濟中的脫鉤問題。首先是跨境投資，從某種意義上講，這個領(lǐng)域是脫鉤議題中最熱門的。
I want to turn to the first slide page two, and begin a discussion about a decoupling in the real economy, that is, in cross-border investment. In some respects, this is the most prominent aspect of decoupling.
當(dāng)然，美國國內(nèi)正在討論這個問題，倡導(dǎo)制造業(yè)回流。希望跨國企業(yè)退出中國，人們對此有不同的稱呼。有人稱之為脫鉤，有人則稱為產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈重組，這張圖上的這個調(diào)查，是美中貿(mào)易全國委員會每年都會開展的，其調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，甚至新冠疫情全球大流行，都沒有從實質(zhì)上改變美國跨國公司的計劃。
And certainly, it's being discussed in the United States, talk about reshoring, and so forth, that multinationals would begin to withdraw from China, people have different names for this, some call it decoupling, reorganizing the supply chains, etc.
But this survey that I'm showing you in this diagram, which is conducted annually by the US-China Business Council, shows that the Trade War, or even the COVID 19 pandemic, has not really changed the plans of American multinational companies.
美中貿(mào)易全國委員會是一個會員制組織，由美國約250家在華經(jīng)營的規(guī)模最大的跨國公司組成，而從圖中可以看出，這些年來，沒當(dāng)他們被問及“貴公司是否有遷離中國的打算”或“有無打算把業(yè)務(wù)遷離中國”時，每年大概90%的公司都會表態(tài)說，沒有計劃遷離。
The US-China Business Council is a membership organization, consisting of about 250 of the largest US multinational companies operating in China. And as you can see from the diagram, when they are asked over the years, has your company moved? Or does it plan to move any operations out of China? Roughly 90% of the companies every year say no, they have no plans to move.
請注意，問的不是 "你們已經(jīng)遷離了嗎"，而是“你們是否考慮過遷離”或者“你們打算遷離嗎”。該圖中較短的柱形顯示，是的，有些人和有些公司正在考慮遷離。正在考慮將業(yè)務(wù)遷離中國的人大多是想搬去其他國家而不是回到美國。
Notice the question is not “have you moved”, but “are you even thinking about it” or “are you planning it”.
The smaller little graphs/lines show that, yes, some people or some companies are thinking of moving, the ones that are thinking of moving out of China are mostly thinking of going somewhere else, somewhere other than the United States.
在最近的調(diào)查中，計劃將部分業(yè)務(wù)帶回美國的公司，只占受訪者的4%左右，看來，大多數(shù)在中國經(jīng)營業(yè)務(wù)的美國大型跨國公司都打算留下，他們是有利可圖的，中國是非常大的，快速增長的市場。即使總統(tǒng)要他們回流，他們也不置可否。
In the most recent survey, the companies that are planning to bring some production back to the US accounts for only about 4% of the respondents. So it seems like most big American multinationals operating in China plan to stay, they are profitable, that’s a very large, rapidly growing market. And even when the President says they need to reshore, there's not very much response.
在下一張圖中，我想大致展示一下流入中國的外國直接投資的情況，不管是打了幾年的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)也好新冠疫情也罷，外國直接投資幾乎未受影響。這張圖上的內(nèi)容，可能看起來有些費力，它向我們展示了2018年、2019年和2020年至今的情況。
I want to look more broadly at FDI inflows into China. And they also seem to be unaffected by either the bilateral trade war with the United States that began a couple of years ago, or affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This diagram is a little bit hard to see, because it's showing us year to date in 2018,2019 And 2020.
在此期間有多少外國直接投資進入中國，而這幾條線幾乎是完全重合的。換句話說，按照每月累計流入量計算，無論是2018年、2019年還是2020年至今，大致是相同的。事實上，幾乎一模一樣。
How much foreign direct investment has come into China. And the lines just almost completely overlap. In other words, the monthly inflows, the cumulative monthly inflows in 2018, 2019, and so far in 2020, are roughly the same.
2018年、2019年約有1380億美元流入中國，而如果在今年還能延續(xù)前8個月的趨勢，那么今年進入中國的外商直接投資額大致將與往年相同。
Indeed, almost exactly the same. This led to about 138 billion in inflows into China in 2018, and 2019. And if the trend of the first eight months continues, we'll have roughly the same amount of foreign direct investment going into China this year.
我想強調(diào)的是，今年的情況非同尋常，因為在全球范圍內(nèi)，外國直接投資流入量下降得相當(dāng)厲害。這是新冠疫情大流行帶來的顯著后果，疫情影響了全球的經(jīng)濟，很多公司的利潤都在下滑，各家公司在國內(nèi)的投資越來越少，在國外的投資也越來越少。
I would underscore that this is very, very unusual this year, because globally, foreign direct investment inflows are down quite sharply. This is the obvious consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic that has affected the entire global economy, profits of many companies are down, they're investing less at home, and they're investing less abroad as well.
所以今年的情況是，中國不僅僅是保持了和前幾年一樣的直接投資流入水平，而且中國在外商直接投資流入量中的比重在極大幅度的上升。所以總得來說，一個基本情況是外商直接投資在中國做得非常好，美國企業(yè)并沒有想著撤離，并且在全球范圍內(nèi)，流入量依然非常強勁。這不像是美國企業(yè)與中國脫鉤的情況。
So what's happening this year is not just that China is maintaining the same level of inflows as in previous years, but its share of foreign direct investment flows is rising very, very sharply. So the basic idea, in summary, is that foreign direct investment is doing very well in China, US companies are not thinking of withdrawing, and globally, inflows remained very strong. This does not look like a situation where US companies are decoupling from China.
再來看下一張圖，我想詳細談?wù)劦诙€方面，也就是中國與世界其他國家的金融一體化。
Now, the next diagram, I want to start talking about the second aspect in more detail, and that is, financial integration between China and the rest of the world.
雖然人們都在談?wù)摻鹑陬I(lǐng)域的對華脫鉤，但中國其實正在日益融入全球金融體系。這一趨勢既體現(xiàn)在證券投資上，又體現(xiàn)在體制改革上。
And even though people are talking about decoupling in the financial sphere, China is increasingly integrated into the global financial system. This is reflected both in portfolio investment and in institutional reforms.
我們先來看看證券投資方面，從圖中可以看出，中國已經(jīng)邁出了一些重要步驟，例如股市通，債市通以及將中國債券納入各種指數(shù)的計劃等。我們可以看到，過去三年里流入中國的證券投資資本呈現(xiàn)出非常急劇上揚的軌跡。
Now, turning first for portfolio investment, you can see in the diagram that a number of important steps have been taken, the stock connect, the bond connect program, the inclusion of Chinese bonds in various indices, then you can see that there has been a very sharp upward trajectory over the last three years in the inflows of portfolio capital into China.
其中藍色代表股票，紅色代表債券。截至今年年中，現(xiàn)在的資本流入總量已達5萬億人民幣，所以，中國是證券資本流入的主要在岸市場。當(dāng)然，除此之外，還有大量在境外上市的中國企業(yè)。特別是股權(quán)資本，所帶來的巨量資本流入，無論資金來自哪里，是香港還是紐約，多達數(shù)萬億美元的外資投資于離岸股權(quán)市場。
That's both stocks, which are shown in blue, and bonds, which are shown in red. And the total now is, as of the middle of this year, that is, it had reached 5 trillion RMB. So China is a major recipient of portfolio capital inflows into the onshore market. And this, of course, is in addition to the very large inflows of capital, particularly equity capital, from listings of Chinese companies offshore. Whether it's Hong Kong, or New York, there's trillions and trillions of US dollars of foreign investment in equities offshore.
這張圖顯示的是中國在岸市場的投資增長非常迅速，這在一定程度上是中國不斷推進資本市場對外開放的結(jié)果，以及其他一些制度性改革，對國際投資者來說，在中國投資股票和債券更具吸引力。
This diagram is now showing that the investments in the onshore market are growing very rapidly. In part, this is a result of the reforms, the connect programs and a number of other institutional reforms that have made investing in equity and debt instruments in China more attractive for international investors.
現(xiàn)在是最后一張幻燈片。我想談?wù)勗谶^去的幾年里中國發(fā)生的體制改革問題。中國已經(jīng)允許外國金融機構(gòu)提高在中國國內(nèi)金融市場上的參與度和持股比例。
Now for my final slide, the next slide, I want to talk about the institutional reforms that have occurred in China over the last couple of years, that are allowing foreign financial institutions to increase their presence and their role in China's domestic financial market.
我想大家都很清楚這些案例。我只給大家看幾個美國公司的相關(guān)案例，這些公司已經(jīng)獲準(zhǔn)從事新的業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域以前，這些公司在合資企業(yè)中僅占有少數(shù)持股比例。
I think we're all well aware of these cases, I'm just showing it a few cases focusing on US firms that have been licensed to undertake new activities. In some cases where they have been in a joint venture in a minority position.
美國公司已經(jīng)獲準(zhǔn)增加持股比例，成為外資控股公司。中國監(jiān)管部門正在向部分外國公司發(fā)放許可證，允許這些公司作為外商獨資企業(yè)運營。我想說，這是一個重大的變化。傳統(tǒng)上，在大多數(shù)情況下，外國金融機構(gòu)只能作為合資企業(yè)的小股東，并且能力受到各方面的限制，無法充分發(fā)掘中國市場的機遇。
The US company has been approved to increase its ownership stake, so that it becomes a majority foreign-owned company. In some cases, the Chinese regulatory authorities are licensing new foreign companies to begin operation as wholly foreign owned companies. This is a major, major change, I would say. Traditionally, foreign financial institutions, for the most part, have been relegated to be minority partners in joint ventures and has restricted their ability to pursue the opportunities that they see in the domestic market.
我們從這張幻燈片中可以看出，首次擴大或批準(zhǔn)的外資企業(yè)活動范圍，包括了支付服務(wù)、投資銀行、網(wǎng)絡(luò)清算、信用評級等。
As you can see from this slide, the range of activities that are being expanded or approved for the first time include payment services, investment banking, network clearing, credit rating, and so forth.
如果要展示所有已經(jīng)通過的審批事項并把世界各地公司的所有項目全部包括進去，就必須占用兩三張幻燈片才行。數(shù)十家外資企業(yè)已經(jīng)獲批擁有多數(shù)股權(quán)或獨資經(jīng)營，其范圍涵蓋了金融服務(wù)的幾乎所有方面。
To show all of the approvals that have occurred, including those from a variety of other companies around the world, you'd have to have two or three more slides, there are a dozen or more foreign companies that have been able to get approval for majority ownership or wholly foreign owned operations in virtually all aspects of financial services.
因此，盡管一些政策制定者在談?wù)撁撱^和回流的話題，但這樣的事情還沒有發(fā)生，而且可能并不會大規(guī)模發(fā)生，而在某些領(lǐng)域，比如我們剛剛了解過的金融領(lǐng)域，即使脫鉤話題的討論熱度不斷上升，中國融入全球金融體系的程度實際上卻在加深。
So in summary, even as some policymakers talk of decoupling and reshoring, it is not yet happening, and may not happen on a widespread basis. And in some areas, as we've seen and talking about the financial sector, China's integration into the global financial system is actually increasing, even as the volume of talk about decoupling keeps going up.
第二，我想重申我的觀點，也就是美國還沒有形成評估脫鉤成本的機制，無法充分評估對中國進口的產(chǎn)品征收關(guān)稅。向中國實施出口技術(shù)管制以及對中國對美投資實施管控等措施的相關(guān)后果，我對這樣的處境感到非常遺憾。
And secondly, I would reiterate my point that the United States has no mechanism to evaluate the costs of decoupling that are the result of tariffs on imports from China, controls on the export of technology to China, and controls on inbound investment from China. I think this is a very unfortunate position to be in.
也許某些領(lǐng)域的脫鉤會為美國帶來一些好處，但這些好處必須與損失放在一起進行考量，而實際上并沒有多少人進行這樣的考量。
Perhaps there are some gains to certain types of decoupling, but they need to be weighed against the costs. And that is simply not happening.
謝謝大家！
Thank you very much.
作者Nicholas Lardy系美國彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所高級研究員，本文系作者在第二屆外灘金融峰會上發(fā)表的演講，未經(jīng)許可不得轉(zhuǎn)載。 
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