Abstract: The rise of the RMB’s international status depends on China’s efforts and the decline of the U.S. dollar’s status. Considering “new trends such as anti-globalization and de-financialization”, not only is “capital account liberalization” no longer “a must for currency internationalization”, but the traditional capital account liberalization and currency internationalization should be reconsidered. China’s monetary authorities should keep pace with the times, reflect upon the goals and maps of RMB internationalization, and make due adjustments. The fundamental way for safeguarding the security of China’s overseas assets and improving cross-border resource allocation does not lie in the internationalization of the RMB but in accelerating the construction of a new development pattern dominated by the domestic macro-circulation and mutually reinforced by the domestic and international dual-circulation. The “de-dollarization” is not a cyclical fluctuation but a long-term trend. National credit, the cornerstone of the international monetary system, has been entirely undermined by the “weaponization” of the U.S. dollar.
I. THE ORIGIN OF RMB INTERNATIONALIZATION AND ITS LATEST PROGRESS
Q1: In your opinion, how should we understand the significance of the pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the current de-dollarization for the RMB internationalization? Generally speaking, since the beginning of the pandemic, RMB has been internationalizing faster than before the pandemic. How do you interpret the reasons?
Yu Yongding: From 2008 to 2009, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, since China held a host of U.S. Treasury and agency bonds (the mortgage-backed security issued by Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae), the Chinese government was concerned about defaults caused by U.S. debt defaults, dollar depreciation, or U.S. inflation. On March 13, 2009, the Chinese government openly expressed concern about the safety of China’s U.S. dollar-denominated assets.
In 2009, Zhou Xiaochuan, then governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), proposed gradually replacing the U.S. dollar, a national currency, with the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the international reserve currency, which the U.S. rejected. The Chiang Mai Initiative, established in 2000, also failed to play its due role in the global financial crisis. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government decided to push forward the RMB internationalization in 2009.
After the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the U.S. in 2008, two ideas emerged for the reform of the international monetary system: one is to gradually replace the U.S. dollar with the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the international reserve currency; the other is to adopt new regional currencies, such as the Asian yuan, through regional financial cooperation, and ultimately produce a multi-polar monetary system consisting of the euro, the Asian yuan, and the U.S. dollar as the international reserve currencies, thus constraining the dollar.
As the above two reform ideas didn’t score outcomes, China decided to take the path of RMB internationalization, aiming to make the RMB equal to the U.S. dollar and the euro, and a pole in the diversified international monetary system. Meanwhile, PBOC also expected the promotion of the RMB internationalization to “force” the reform of the exchange rate system and the opening up of the capital account.
The first step of RMB internationalization was to export RMB across the border in two ways: first, through trading accounts, and second, through capital and financial accounts. China started RMB internationalization with RMB import settlement.
As the RMB was in an appreciation stage at that time, overseas exporters were willing to accept the RMB as a means of settlement. The cross-border RMB business had achieved rapid development since its launch in July 2009, with its scale surging from less than 3.6 billion yuan in 2009 [1] to 2.08 trillion yuan in 2011 [2]. However, from 2015 to 2016, the RMB trade settlement slowed down due to the poor domestic economic situation and the RMB depreciation against the U.S. dollar. For quite some time thereafter, the RMB internationalization slowed down significantly.
Due to the so-called “network effect”, the rise of the RMB’s international status depends not only on China’s efforts but also on the decline of the U.S. dollar’s status.
First, the international balance of payments in the U.S. deteriorated again. In 2021, the net foreign liabilities of the U.S. exceeded $18 trillion, accounting for nearly 80% of its GDP. The current tightening monetary policy has led to a gradual increase in its financing cost abroad. Unless the U.S. solves its “external sustainability” problem, other countries will seek alternatives to the U.S. dollar to hedge and diversify risks again, enabling the RMB to rise in international standing.
Of course, the most significant reason for the current progress in RMB internationalization is the changing geopolitical situation. The measure taken by the U.S. and its allies to freeze 300 billion U.S. dollars of foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Central Bank since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become the most significant landmark event in the evolution of the international monetary system since the “Nixon Shock”. National credit, the cornerstone of the international monetary system, has been entirely undermined by the “weaponization” of the U.S. dollar.
After the U.S. and its allies froze Russia’s foreign exchange reserves, many banks in Russia converted plenty of foreign exchange reserves into RMB assets, replacing the New York-based Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) with the RMB Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) set up by the PBOC.
Many countries have signed agreements with the PBOC on offshore RMB clearing banks, currency swaps, and local currencies for settlement. These agreements, especially the currency swap ones, are undoubtedly a crucial step forward in RMB internationalization. However, the currency swap agreements have more reflected the trend towards “de-dollarization”, especially among developing countries trying to stop themselves from depending on the U.S. dollar liquidity.
In bilateral trade and investment, countries signing swap agreements can meet the liquidity needs of their enterprises with RMB (essentially by borrowing RMB from the PBOC), avoiding the dilemma of liquidity shortages brought by the unavailability of the U.S. dollar. For diversification and other considerations, over 70 central banks worldwide have included RMB in their foreign exchange reserves.
According to reports, China and the Gulf States have agreed that China will increase its oil and gas imports and settle with the RMB, which is undoubtedly crucial progress towards a multi-polar international monetary system.
Barry Eichengreen, an American economist, points out that even countries that don’t think of an issue where they would run into the geopolitical guns of the U.S. are worried about the dollar “weaponization” and the American banking system. As a result, they are looking for alternatives, at least supplements, to the dollar for reserves and payments [2]. The new geopolitical changes have enabled the RMB to play a greater role in the international arena.
In 2021 and 2022, the RMB cross-border receipts and payments totaled 36.61 trillion yuan and 42 trillion yuan, respectively, growing rapidly[3]. According to China.com, RMB is taking a bigger share in cross-border receipts and payments, approaching 50% in 2022[4]. It is also reported that the RMB’s share in China’s cross-border payments and receipts has risen from close to zero in 2010 to a record 48 % at the end of March 2023[5].
However, it should be noted that, in 2021, the amount of RMB cross-border trade receipts and payments in goods was only 5.11 trillion yuan, below the 2014 level. China’s RMB cross-border trade receipts and payments for goods reached 5.9 trillion yuan in 2014, accounting for 24% of China’s total cross-border trade, which was 24.6 trillion yuan. In 2021, China’s total cross-border trade was 39 trillion yuan. In other words, the 2021 share of RMB goods trade receipts and payments only took up 13% of the cross-border trade, only half of that in 2014.
Another noteworthy fact is that internationalized currencies are not only widely used internationally as settlement currencies but also as denomination currencies, invoicing currencies, and reserve currencies. Many enterprises in China still use foreign currencies (mainly U.S. dollars) for valuation and invoicing, even though they use RMB for settlement in trade. In this case, enterprises cannot fully hedge their exchange rate risk, probably because China’s enterprises lack the bargaining power to convince the other party to price and invoice with RMB[6].
According to available information, it can be inferred that the proportion of RMB as the currency of valuation and invoicing in international trade has gradually increased. However, due to the statistical limits, we cannot accurately conclude the quantity and proportion of RMB as the currency of valuation and invoicing in the goods trade.
As studies point out, although trade is still the basis of RMB cross-border settlement, its share shows a continuous decline; capital and financial accounts, especially non-direct investment capital and financial ones, are rapidly increasing, accounting for over 60%, becoming the main part of cross-border RMB settlement[7]. The rapid growth in RMB cross-border payments and receipts is largely the result of the government’s “relaxation and facilitation”. It is worth further analyzing why the amount of RMB cross-border payments and receipts in 2021 was as high as 36.61 trillion yuan while the amount in trade in goods was only 5.11 trillion yuan.
It should also be noted that though RMB has outnumbered the U.S. dollar in the proportion of cross-border payments and receipts, globally, the proportion of RMB as a settlement currency, a denomination currency, an invoicing currency, a carrier currency, and a reserve currency is 2% or even lower[8]. The RMB internationalization still has a long way to go.
II. CONDITIONS FOR THE RMB INTERNATIONALIZATION
Q2: In your opinion, what are the conditions for the internationalization of a country’s currency? Traditionally, capital account liberalization is a must for currency internationalization, but it is no longer so due to anti-globalization and de-financialization, as some have pointed out recently. What are your thoughts on this?
Yu Yongding: The basic functions of currencies include valuation, settlement, investment, and value storage. A currency that can fulfill these functions in cross-border trade and financial transactions is an international currency.
Under current accounts, RMB flows out across the border through trade import settlement. Under capital and financial accounts, the RMB is used for direct investment (e.g., in countries along the Belt and Road), “Bond Connect” (southbound), RQDII[9], “Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect”[10] (southbound), and “Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect”[11] (southbound). Meanwhile, RMB flows back through cross-border channels such as the “Bond Connect” (northbound), RQFII, CIBM (Interbank Bond Market), “Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect” (northbound), and “Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect” (northbound).
In cross-border RMB outflows and inflows, the RMB cross-border payments are growing, and its share is increasing. A higher level of internationalization is the wide use of the RMB by foreign investors in international trade and financial transactions unrelated to China and the long-term holding of RMB and RMB assets.
Domestic conditions for a country’s currency to become an international currency include a stable and strong macroeconomic landscape, clearly defined and protected property rights, a flexible exchange rate regime, and free cross-border movement of funds; external conditions include specific geopolitical conditions and the decline or fall of the U.S. dollar due to the U.S. itself.
The CIPS plays an essential role in making RMB an important international currency because the system supports the cross-border flow of RMB. The CIPS is of great importance in facilitating cross-border RMB business processing, supporting the cross-border settlement of trade in goods and services, cross-border direct investment, cross-border financing, cross-border personal remittances, and other businesses. With the U.S. arbitrarily imposing financial sanctions, kicking out sanctioned countries from the universal messaging system SWIFT and the settlement system, the improvement of China’s CIPS has become increasingly significant, and it is believed that more financial institutions will use CIPS in the future.
It is widely believed in the financial community that “capital account liberalization is a must for currency internationalization”. Each stage of RMB internationalization corresponds to a step of capital account liberalization. For example, the RMB internationalization was launched in July 2009 after the State Council approved a pilot scheme for RMB settlement of cross-border trade.
However, “a must” only refers to the sequence or/and causality of two events, whereas capital account liberalization and RMB internationalization are gradual and long-term processes. In a process consisting of a series of events, one can only say whether event A is a must for event B. It is hard to conclude whether a process consisting of events A, C, E, and G is a must for one consisting of events B, D, F, and H. The key is to analyze issues on a case-by-case basis.
Considering “new trends such as anti-globalization and de-financialization”, not only is “capital account liberalization” no longer “a must for currency internationalization”, but the traditional capital account liberalization and currency internationalization should be reconsidered. We should indeed study the possible development trends in global geopolitics and design blueprints based on our conclusions.
China must be careful in internationalizing the RMB and first create the necessary institutional and market conditions rather than fully opening up the capital account without them.
Notably, while seeing the benefits of currency internationalization, we should also be aware of the increasing financial risks it may bring. For example, since Hong Kong is an international financial center, cross-border capital can flow in and out of Hong Kong without any hindrance. However, for special reasons, the Hong Kong dollar is not an international currency, and it is not easy to buy Hong Kong dollars in financial markets around the world. During the Asian financial crisis, due to the difficulty in obtaining Hong Kong dollars outside Hong Kong, the Hong Kong monetary authorities raised the interest rate on inter-bank lending and thwarted international speculators’ intentions of “short selling” the Hong Kong dollar and the stock market. In contrast, Thai baht is more internationalized than the Hong Kong dollar, and international speculators can get the baht outside of Thailand, short-sell it in Thailand’s foreign exchange market, and ultimately win big.
Yi Gang, the former governor of the PBOC, has repeatedly stressed that “the RMB internationalization should be market-driven instead of being promoted by the central bank”[12]; “it is important to understand in depth that the steady development of China’s economy remains unchanged and that the market remains a driving force, the most important foundation, and pillar of RMB internationalization”[13]. These views are undoubtedly correct.
In the ultimate analysis, the internationalization of the RMB stands as one of several strategies for China to enhance cross-border resource allocation and safeguard its overseas assets. While the liberalization of the capital account and the reform of the exchange rate system possess distinct objectives and processes, they do intersect with the internationalization of renminbi. However, these aspects should not be subservient to the aims and procedures of RMB internationalization. The process of RMB internationalization comes with its own prerequisites and costs. The significance of RMB internationalization is undeniable, yet it shouldn't be exaggerated. During the pursuit of RMB internationalization, a balanced assessment of pros and cons is imperative prior to any decision-making. The fundamental solution is to establish a novel “dual-circulation” development pattern with an emphasis on the domestic economic cycle.
Q3: Could you share your insights and recommendations for advancing the framework for overseas utilization of RMB and boosting its competitiveness?
YU Yongding: At present, China's top priority should be to ensure the safety of its overseas assets.
Keynes once stated, "Owe Your Banker ￡1,000 and You Are at His Mercy; Owe Him ￡1 Million, and the Position Is Reversed"[14]. The United States is China's largest debtor, and from March 2000 to April 2023, China's holdings of U.S. Treasuries will average $1.037 trillion[15]. The security of China's holdings in U.S. dollar-denominated treasuries is progressively evolving into a geopolitical concern.
As early as December 2013, Martin Wolf contended in a Financial Times article that in the event of a conflict between the U.S. and China, the U.S. could potentially interrupt China’s global trade and even seize a portion of China's liquid financial assets. While I've frequently cited Martin Wolf's stance over time, I'm not entirely persuaded that such a scenario is probable. Although it was previously unlikely, the "financial nuclear bomb" that the U.S. and its allies unleashed on Russia on February 28, 2022 — freezing $300 billion in foreign reserves held by Russia's central bank — has brought this seemingly remote prospect into closer view.
Rajan, the former governor of the Central Bank of India, noted that following the freezing of Russia's central bank foreign exchange reserves, concerns would arise among countries like China and India about their own foreign exchange reserves. Should certain nations opt to freeze assets, foreign exchange reserves could become unusable. Given the limited number of liquid reserve currencies like the euro and the dollar, governments may need to impose constraints on cross-border corporate bank loans and other activities alike. Some countries might even consider collaborating to establish new messaging systems as alternatives to SWIFT, a move that could potentially fragment the global payment network.
Das, the current governor of India's central bank, has conveyed that India's foreign reserves are well diversified. Although India might not face sanctions currently, this is a concern that every nation must contemplate in the future. So what about China? In fact, former U.S. President Donald Trump and various U.S. politicians have previously issued threats to seize China's foreign exchange reserves on multiple occasions.
While RMB internationalization can mitigate currency risk and transaction costs for Chinese businesses, it remains questionable whether RMB internationalization could guarantee the security of China's overseas RMB assets if the U.S. were to freeze or confiscate these assets and refuse to repay the its RMB debt to China. If the U.S. declines to honor its debt obligations, our options are limited, irrespective of whether the debt is denominated in U.S. dollars or another currency.
The resolution to China's overseas asset security predicament does not hinge on RMB internationalization but rather on a "dual circulation" development pattern in which the domestic economic cycle plays a leading role while international economic cycle remains its extension and supplement. More precisely, China must expedite the restructuring of its economic framework, prioritizing economic growth rooted in domestic demand rather than external demand.
In the short term, China should invigorate economic growth by stimulating both investment and consumer demand, thus expanding import demand. In the long run, structural reforms and shifts in corporate incentives should bolster demand for imports, stabilize exports, and attain equilibrium in foreign trade. This might even involve tolerating trade deficits for a defined period to exchange accumulated dollar "IOU" for tangible resources vital to domestic economic growth.
Moreover, a nation with a current account surplus inherently acts as a capital exporter and a creditor. When RMB exported through import settlements is repatriated through export settlements, foreign importers' access to the renminbi will inevitably be lesser than that they can access from foreign exporters. Consequently, foreign importers can only cover goods equivalent to the total value of China's trade surplus in dollars or alternate currencies other than the renminbi (without regard to investment revenues). This process transforms China's current account surplus into dollar and various forms of dollar (or other hard currency) claims (including U.S. Treasuries, corporate bonds, bank deposits, and trade credits).
In essence, maintaining a current account surplus classifies China as a net creditor rather than a net debtor. As a net creditor, China cannot transform RMB and RMB assets into claims held by foreign investors, hence missing out on Seigniorage. It's evident that while maintaining a current account surplus, China also cannot render foreign investors net creditors by exporting RMB through the capital account.
Several economists argue that while the Eurozone, Japan, and Switzerland maintain current account surpluses, their currencies are internationally used and recognized. My perspective is that the divergent views on this matter stem from distinct definitions of internationalized currencies. Considering usage alone, although in a relatively low proportion, the renminbi now is the fifth most active currency for global payments by value, stands as the fifth-largest international reserve currency, and holds the third spot by weight in the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights basket of currencies. In contrast to numerous international currencies employed to varying extents, the RMB merits classification as an internationalized currency.
The challenge lies in the fact that from an overarching perspective, although certain foreign investors can hold RMB assets and foreign central banks can possess Chinese government bonds as foreign exchange reserves, China, as a creditor nation, cannot exploit the RMB "IOUs" in a manner akin to the United States.
During the course of promoting the internationalization of RMB, two persistent issues require resolution:
Firstly, despite being a country with current account surpluses, China's accumulated surpluses spanning 2014 to 2022 surpass its net international investment position (NIIP) over the same period notably. While theoretically, the accumulated current account surplus should equate to the growth in net foreign assets, disparities may arise due to valuation effects (NIIP changes resulting from the exchange rate and asset price fluctuations) and statistical discrepancy. Nonetheless, the substantial gap between our accumulated current account surplus since 2014 and the upsurge in net foreign assets cannot be solely attributed to valuation effects and statistical discrepancies.
A conceivable explanation for this discrepancy is capital flight, which, to tell you the truth, was serious in China during certain periods particularly. The net outflow of Chinese capital registered on the Balance of Payments (BOP) hasn't been entirely mirrored by new Chinese net foreign assets on the International Investment Position (IIP), thereby introducing a disparity between the cumulative current account surplus and the growth in net foreign assets. Acknowledging the challenge of capital flight is vital, and unwarranted secrecy surrounding it serves no purpose. Capital flight is a common issue faced by all nations (including the United States), although for varied reasons and outcomes. It's crucial to objectively assess the role of capital flight in contributing to this disparity without underplaying or exaggerating its influence.
What’s more, the discrepancy and omissions on the BOP are caused by statistical problems, which are white noise. However, there is also a significant occurrence of discrepancy and omissions in China's BOP year after year, often characterized as capital outflows. This is likely due to the fact that certain outflows from China (including instances of capital flight) remain unrecorded in the balance of payments. Furthermore, some of these outflows are not even accounted for within the discrepancy and omissions category.
The second issue revolves around China consistently reporting a deficit in overseas investment income over the past two decades, despite maintaining its status as a net foreign creditor. This incongruity largely stems from China's returns on foreign assets falling short of the costs incurred to attract diverse forms of foreign investment (primarily U.S. Treasuries and agency debt).
To address this problem, it is necessary to adjust the structure of international investment position (IIP) structure. The transformation of the IIP hinges on the committed implementation of a novel “dual-circulation” development pattern with emphasis on the domestic economic cycle, thereby influencing foreign trade policy and investment attraction policy, as well as increasing overseas investment efficacy. Although RMB internationalization can contribute to improving the structure of overseas assets and liabilities, its potential to convert investment income from a deficit to a surplus is limited.
In sum, problems such as enhancing the security of China's overseas financial assets, refining the structure of its balance of payments and international investment position, and curbing capital flight entail addressing issues like property rights protection, the timing of capital account liberalization, exchange rate policies, and macroeconomic regulations. These matters transcend the realm of RMB internationalization.
The Future of the International Monetary System and RMB Internationalization
Q4: Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar has repeatedly suggested establishing an "Asian Monetary Fund" this year, with the concept of settling trade between multiple Asian nations using local currencies. What is your perspective on this proposal? Has this concept, initially proposed in the 1990s, gained more viability or feasibility at present?
Yu Yongding: During the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan's Vice-Minister of Finance, introduced the notion of an "Asian monetary fund". However, this concept was not realized due to U.S. opposition and the limited active backing from other Asian countries, including China.
It is reported that Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar, in the first half of this year, told parliamentarians that given the economic power of Asian countries such as China and Japan, there is no reason for Malaysia to remain dependent on the U.S. dollar and that the central banks of China and Malaysia had begun discussions on trade settlement in each other's currency [16].
Undoubtedly, enhancing monetary cooperation within the Asian region is crucial. Nonetheless, due to geopolitical factors, the current proposition of establishing an Asian monetary fund may not be realistic. Asia already possesses the multilateral Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), and refining this initiative to maximize its potential might prove to be a more pragmatic choice.
Q5: Following the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the U.S. has increasingly employed financial sanctions as weapons, prompting a surge in the exploration of "de-dollarization" across the globe. In your view, is the current "de-dollarization" trend a fundamental shift or a temporary fluctuation? What implications does this hold for the international monetary system? Is the dominance of the U.S. dollar within the international monetary system facing substantial destabilizing factors?
Yu Yongding: "De-dollarization" is not a cyclical swing but rather a prolonged trajectory. The misuse of financial sanctions by the U.S. and the "weaponization" of the dollar have driven numerous non-U.S. allies to contemplate reducing their dependence on the dollar.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar's declaration of distancing from the dollar and the execution of the Currency Swap Agreements between many central banks of developing nations and the People's Bank of China are indicative of this trend.
The progression of the international monetary system will be contingent on the geopolitical landscape. In fact, U.S. economists have already speculated on potential future directions for the international monetary system. Eichengreen, for instance, has proposed two plausible scenarios:
The status quo is maintained: In this scenario, the U.S. continues its approach of “building high yards, small fence” towards China, but both countries remain each other's principal or primary trade partners. China would enhance its payment and clearing system infrastructure, expand currency swap agreements with foreign central banks, and encourage authorization for local banks and enterprises to employ the renminbi. Over time, the role of the renminbi, the Chinese banking system, and the China International Payment System (CIPS) in global payments and settlements would grow. Countries seeking to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar could employ offshore RMB centers for transactions, leading to an increased array of non-traditional reserve currencies. However, the international status of the renminbi would still lag significantly behind that of the U.S. dollar.
An international geopolitical rupture: If direct and indirect financial connections between China and the U.S. are severed completely, the issue facing the international monetary system would no longer be just "de-dollarization," but the potential fragmentation or complete division of the international monetary system, as pointed out by Rajan.
Given the evolving geopolitical context and emerging trends in the international monetary system, China's monetary authorities must revisit the goals and roadmap of RMB internationalization, making the necessary adjustments in response.
Bibliography:
1.https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1649442234192724121&wfr=spider&for=pc
2.Barry Eichengreen：Prepared for the meeting of the Asian Economic Policy Review panel, 13 April 2023.
3.https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1675326686630780776&wfr=spider&for=pc
4.https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1763753656019112539&wfr=spider&for=pc
5.https://news.ifeng.com/c/8PKpsewGL64
6.http://www.modernbankers.com/html/2020/financiercon_1118/1156.html
7.School of Finance, Renmin University of China &China Financial Policy Research Center
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/article/yanjiu/hangyezk/201907/86383.html
8.https://news.cnstock.com/news,bwkx-202307-5085552.htm
9.Domestic RMB investment in overseas RMB-denominated capital market has a different approval system from that of the QDII quota and RQDII is based on the actual scale of collection. In the overseas RMB capital market, a qualified domestic investment enterprise (QDIE) or limited partner (QDLP) “collects at home and invests abroad”, with the RMB, converting into U.S. dollars before investing. RQDII uses RMB as the investment currency, so the market needs to be located in the offshore RMB center, which has been suspended.
10.Mainland investors purchase Hong Kong stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange with RMB.
11.Mainland investors purchasing Hong Kong stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are quoted and transacted in Hong Kong dollars and settled in RMB.
12.https://m.nbd.com.cn/articles/2012-10-14/687708.html
13.http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-03/27/content_5181205.htm
14.https://quoteinvestigator.com/2019/04/23/bank/
15.https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/holdings-of-us-treasury-securities/holdings-of-us-treasury-securities
16.https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1762249588664172583&wfr=spider&for=pc
This is the interview made by CF40 with Yu Yongding, CF40 Advisor and academician of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article only represents the author’s personal opinion and does not represent the position of CF40 or the author’s institution.
